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PROJECT
THE SPEEDY TRIAL ACT:
AN EMPIRICAL STUDY*
INTRODUCTION

Few statutes have engendered as much opposition as the Speedy Trial Act
of 1974 (Act).' The Act embodies Congress' recognition that the public, as
well as a defendant, possesses a right to a speedy trial. 2 Although not the first
attempt to safeguard society's interest in the prompt disposition of criminal
cases, 3 the Act is unprecedented in the stringency of its measures. On July 1,
1979, the Act's permanent limits become operative: subject to certain exclud-4
able delays, a defendant must be brought to trial within 100 days of arrest.
The penalty for violation is dismissal of the charges. s To lessen the shock,
Congress provided that the three years prior to that date would serve as a6
phase-in period during which the time limits would be gradually tightened,7
and that violation of these traditional limits would not result in dismissal.
Nevertheless, the enunciation of the permanent limits has provoked under*

The authors extend their appreciation to Professor Michael M. Martin of the Fordham
University School of Law, who is the Speedy Trial Reporter for the Southern District of New
York, and Professor Daniel Freed of the Yale Law School for their assistance and contributions
to the publication of this article.
1. 18 U.S.C. §§ 3161-3174 (1976). Commentators critical of the Act include: Black, The
Speedy Trial Act-Justice on the Assembly Line, 8 St. Mary's L.J. 225 (1976); Committee on the
Federal Courts, Association of the Bar of the City of New York, Evaluating The Implementation
of The Speedy TrialAct in the Southern District of New York, 33 The Rec. 510 (1978) [hereinafter
cited as Southern DistrictEvaluation]; Frase, The Speedy Trial Act of 1974, 43 U. Chi. L. Rev.
667 (1976); Hansen & Reed, The Speedy Trial Act of 1974 in ConstitutionalPerspective, 47 Miss.
L.J. 365 (1976); Lacey, An Outline and Appraisal of the Federal Speedy Trial Act, 2 Seton Hall
Legis. J. 1 (1976); Platt, The Speedy Trial Act of 1974: A Critical Commentary, 44 Brooklyn L.
Rev. 757 (1978); Russ & Mandelkern, The Speedy Trial Act of 1974: A Trap for the Unwary
Practitioner,2 J. Crim. Def. 1 (1976); Comment, The Speedy Trial Act of 1974: A Suggestion, 8
Cum. L. Rev. 905 (1978) [hereinafter cited as Suggestion]; Note, Speedy Trials: Recent Developments Concerning A Vital Right, 4 Fordham Urb. L.J. 351 (1976) [hereinafter cited as Vital
Right].
2. S. Rep. No. 1021, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 21 (1974) [hereinafter cited as 1974 Senate Report];
H.R. Rep. No. 1058, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 15, reprinted in [1974] U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News
7401, 7408 [hereinafter cited as 1974 House Report]; Speedy Trial Act of 1974: Hearings on S.
754, H.R. 7873, H.R. 207, H.R. 658, H.R. 687, H.R. 773 and H.R. 4807 Before the Subcon.
on Crime of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 501 (1974) [hereinafter cited
as 1974 House Hearings].
3. See notes 28-64 infra and accompanying text.
4. 18 U.S.C. § 3161(b)-(c) (1976); see notes 65-68 infra and accompanying text.
5. 18 U.S.C. § 3162(a) (1976).
6. Id. § 3161(f)-(g). During the transitional period, the time from arrest to indictment has
decreased from 60 (1976-77), to 45 (1977-78), to 35 days (1978-79). 18 U.S.C. § 3161(1) (1976).
Pursuant to § 3161(g), the time from arraignment to trial has decreased from 180 (1976-77), to 120
(1977-78), to 80 days (1978-79). Through all stages, however, the time from indictment to
arraignment has remained 10 days. Id. §§ 3161(b), 3163(a).
7. Id. § 3163(c).
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standable outcries of resistance from a federal system that had often tolerated
pretrial delays of several years. 8
Much of the controversy stems from the unique "planning" nature of the
Act. 9 During the interim period before the effective datp of the permanent
limits, federal courts must report problems encountered under the transitional
limits, make recommendations for amendment of the statute, and request additional resources needed to expedite criminal cases. 10 Several districts have
taken that opportunity to join in the predictions of commentators that compliance with the permanent limits will be difficult to impossible. I
The criticism centers predominantly on the Act's effect upon courts, defendants, and defense attorneys. 12 District judges complain that, notwithstanding the Act's caveat that speedy criminal dispositions should not prejudice
civil litigation, the pressure to comply even with the transitional limits has
forced them to neglect their civil dockets. 13 Indeed, the pending civil caseload
for all districts has risen almost twenty percent since the imposition of the
transitional limits. 14 In addition, several districts report that the short limits
8.

See note 1 supra and accompanying text.

9. See 18 U.S.C. § 3165 (1976).
10.

Id. § 3167; see Administrative Office of the United States Courts, Report on the Im-

plementation of Title I of the Speedy Trial Act of 1974, at 13 (1978) (hereinafter cited as 1978
Speedy Trial Report].
11. The Judicial Conference of the United States ha' recommended that the "ultimate time
strictures of Section 3161 of 30 days from arrest to indictment, ten days from indictment to
arraignment, and sixty days from indictment to trial be changed to sixty days from arrest to
indictment, twenty days from indictment to arraignment, and not less than thirty nor more than
one hundred days from arraignment to trial." 1978 Speedy Trial Report, supra note 10, at 27. All
planning groups apparently supported this proposal; some suggested that the time limits be
relaxed even further. Id. Several districts requested that Congress increase the arrest-toindictment interval to 45 days, the indictment-to-arraignment interval to 15 days, and the
arraignment-to-trial interval to 90, 120, or 180 days. Other districts suggested an overall single
time limit from arrest to trial. Several districts recommended that the Act be amended to provide
that time saved in one interval can be applied to other intervals. Id. at Al.
12. "Defense attorneys, some of whom term the law the 'Speedy Conviction Act,' complain
that they don't have time to prepare adequate defenses. Prosecutors say the inflexible deadlines
are forcing them to waste staff time, delay arrests and ignore some criminals they would otherwise be pursuing. Judges, although they generally say they can live with the deadlines, are
nevertheless growing weary, and in some cases testy, over long hours on the bench and scheduling complexities resulting from the act's requirements." Wall St. J., Sept. 1, 1977, at 28, col. 1.
Judge Constance Baker Motley of the Southern District of New York has also noted some of the
effects of the Act: "Defense counsel and the United States Attorney's Office both are unduly
pressed for time. Judges, who have the sole responsibility for ensuring compliance with the Act's
mandates, are forced into a time-consuming, impractical monitoring of three separate prosecutive
intervals, instead of a single arrest-to-trial period." Memorandum from Judge Constance Baker
Motley to the Committee on Speedy Trial of the Criminal Justice Section of the American Bar
Association, Recommendation Re: Speedy Trial Act 3 (Feb. 26, 1977), quoted in Suggestion,
supra note 1, at 907 n.14; accord, 65 A.B.A. J. 23 (1979).
13. See 1978 Speedy Trial Report, supra note 10, at 13. Forty-four planning groups reported
increased delays in their disposition of civil cases. Id.; see notes 152-54 infra and accompanying
text.
14. The pending civil caseload for all district courts increased from 140,189 on June 30, 1976
to 166,462 on June 30, 1978, a rise of 18.7% since the implementation of the Act. 1978 Speedy
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impede court scheduling flexibility, and prevent effective calendar administration in general.' 5 They allege that the number of judges is simply inadequate to 16cope with these additional strains on an already congested judicial system.
Perhaps the heaviest burdens of the Act have fallen upon defendants and
defense counsel. Defense attorneys argue that the Act provides insufficient
time to prepare an effective defense, especially when indictment precedes
arrest.17 In that situation, the defense has only minimal time to prepare for
trial. The prosecutor, on the other hand, can prepare his case extensively
before indictment.' 8
Moreover, several districts allege that the ten day period from
indictment to arraignment is too short to determine an appropriate plea. 19 As
a result, defendants have entered more pro forma not guilty pleas,2 0 thereby
increasing the number of cases proceeding to trial that would otherwise have
been terminated by guilty pleas. 21 Even when the initial plea is later changed
to guilty, substantial effort is wasted in the interim while prosecutors ready
the case for trial. 22 Finally, both defense attorneys and prosecutors have
argued that the short limits have led judges to deny continuances for attorneys' scheduling conflicts. 23 Both groups have accordingly been forced to
reassign more cases. 24 In addition to requiring duplication of effort, increased
reassignments have forced defense attorneys to reduce their federal criminal
caseloads. 2 5 Representation of defendants in federal court has thus been rendered more unattractive for the private practitioner.
Based largely on these complaints, most published analyses have concluded
that the Act is sufficiently disruptive of the present system to warrant relaxation of its time strictures.2 6 And, as the permanent limits draw near, the calls
for amendment increase.2 This study will contend, however, that extending
Trial Report, supra note 10, at 13. Civil filings remained fairly constant from June 30, 1976 to
June 30, 1977, and increased 5.9% over the twelve month period ending June 30, 1978. Administrative Office of the United States Courts, Annual Report of the Director 59 (1978) [hereinafter
cited as 1978 Administrative Office Report].
15. Speedy Trial Report, supra note 10, at 13.
16. Because of increased caseloads and the need to meet the deadlines of the Act, 120
additional full-time judgeships and 2 additional temporary judgeships were requested by the
district planning groups. Id. at 25.
17. Id. at 13. Thirty-four of the 94 planning groups reported this problem.
18. Id.; see notes 178-81 infra and accompanying text.
19. 1978 Speedy Trial Report, supra note 10, at 14; Frase, supra note 1, at 679; Suggestion,
supra note 1, at 917.
20. See notes 184-85 infra and accompanying text.
21. Eight district plans indicated that these pleas added to court congestion. 1978 Speedy
Trial Report, supra note 10, at 14.
22. Id.; Frase, supra note 1, at 679; Suggestion, supra note 1, at 917.
23. 1978 Speedy Trial Report, supra note 10, at 13.
24. Id. at 14.
25. Id.
26. See Address by Warren E. Burger, Chief Justice of the United States, American Bar
Association Midyear Meeting (Feb. 11, 1979); note 1 supra and accompanying texL
27. 65 A.B.A. J. 23 (1979); Address by Warren E. Burger, Chief Justice of the United States,
American Bar Association Midyear Meeting (Feb. 11, 1979). The Subcommittee on the Constitu-
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the time strictures is presently too hasty a solution.
Analysis of the Act's effect in the Districts of Connecticut, New Jersey, and
Eastern New York, focusing primarily on the experiences of judges, prosecutors, and defense attorneys, indicates that the Act has found greater
acceptance and created fewer difficulties than many of its opponents presume.
Moreover, the problems created or exacerbated by the short time limits, especially those encountered by defendants and their counsel, can be effectively
remedied by proper use of measures presently contained within the Act. Consequently, lengthening the final limits is at this juncture both unnecessary

and, in view of Congress' intent to protect society's interest in speedy trials,
undesirable.
Part I of this Project examines the rules and standards that governed the
prompt disposition of criminal cases prior to the Act. It reveals that the Act is
not a sudden encroachment upon the unfettered discretion of federal courts over
their criminal calendars, but is in fact the last in a series of statutory and
regulatory pronouncements recognizing the need to protect society's interest in
speedy trials. Part II outlines the methodology of the study and presents a brief
comparison of the three districts in which the study was conducted. Part III
examines the relation of the Act to the civil dockets within the three districts,
and concludes that the increased emphasis on criminal cases has had little
measurable effect on the districts' efficiency in handling their civil caseloads.
Part IV addresses the hardships faced by defendants and defense attorneys
under the Act. It argues that the problems of insufficient preparation time and
attorney scheduling conflicts can be remedied by liberal use of the Act's
excludable time provisions, and that increasing the time limits is therefore
presently unwarranted. Part V considers the propriety of waiver of the Act by
the defendant, and concludes that use of that mechanism at once contravenes
legislative intent and is unnecessary as a method of alleviating the pressures of
compliance.

I.
A.

ORIGINS OF THE!: ACT

Pre-Act Developments-Recognitionof the Public'sRight to a Speedy
Trial

As early as 1905, the Supreme Court explicitly recognized that the sixth

amendment guarantee of a speedy trial protects the public as well as the
accused. 28 The Court has also noted, however, that the interests of society in
prompt dispositions frequently are opposed to those of the defendant.
The public is concerned with the effective prosecution of criminal cases, both to restrain
those guilty of crime and to deter those contemplating it. Just as delay may impair the
ability of the accused to defend himself, so it may reduce the capacity of the government
to prove its case. Moreover, while awaiting trial, an accused who is at large may become
a fugitive from justice or commit other criminal acts. And the greater the lapse of time
tion tentatively scheduled hearings on amendment proposals for March 1979, but declared that
they would probably be held only if the Committee were convinced the Act Is unworkable
despite good faith efforts of the districts to comply. 65 A.B.A. J. 23 (1979).
28. Beavers v. Haubert, 198 U.S. 77, 87 (1905).
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between the commission of an offense
and the conviction of the offender, the less the
29
deterrent value of his conviction.

Consequently, while a defendant's decision not to demand a speedy trial may
work to his advantage, it may also cause substantial public injustice.
Despite the traditional legitimacy accorded the public's right to speedy justice, little was done until the late 1960's to alleviate the hardships to society
caused by excessive delays. That decade witnessed alarming rises in the
backlogs of federal and state court calendars, 30 to which frequent delays in
bringing criminal cases to trial increasingly contributed. The test employed to
determine a defendant's speedy trial rights was inadequate to decrease the
backlogs, as it turned on an ad hoc assessment of the merits in each case and
therefore often added to the delay. 3 ' It soon became apparent that protection
of the public's interest and reduction of court congestion demanded the 32imposition of specific standards for prompt disposition of criminal cases.
The American Bar Association (ABA) promulgated the first such guidelines
in 1968. Its Standards Relating to Speedy Trial33 recommended that each
state establish a single overall time limit within which trial must begin,3 4 to
be triggered by a specified event such as arraignment or first appearance. 3S In
clear deference to the broader societal interests at stake, the Standards advised that the time limits should36commence regardless of the defendant's
failure to demand a speedy trial.
The ABA plan also permitted the court to exclude periods of delay for
29. Dickey v. Florida, 398 U.S. 30, 42 (1970) (citation omitted). As is frequently observed,
delay may cause witnesses to disappear, memories to fade and evidence to become unavailable.
Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 521 (1972); ABA Project on Standards for Criminal Justice,
Standards Relating to Speedy Trials § 1.1, Commentary at 10-11 (Approved Draft 1968)
[hereinafter cited as ABA Standards]. For a discussion of the detrimental effect of delay on
rehabilitation and deterrence, see J. Bentham, The Theory of Legislation (1931).
30. See United States ex rel. Frizer v. McMann, 437 F.2d 1312, 1314-15 (2d Cir. 1971) (en
banc).
31. In Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514 (1972), the Court refused to quantify the sixth amendment guarantee, reasoning that to do so would require the Court "to engage in legislative or
rulemaking activity, rather than in the adjudicative process." Id. at 523; see 1974 House Report,
supra note 2, at 12, reprinted in [1974] U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News at 7405. The Court
declared, however, that state legislatures, and presumably Congress, "are free to prescribe a
reasonable period consistent with constitutional standards .... 407 U.S. at 523; see Frase, supra
note 1, at 667. The Court identified four factors to be considered in determining whether depriovation of a defendant's sixth amendment right has occurred: length of delay; reason for delay;
defendant's assertion of his right; and prejudice to the defendant. 407 U.S. at 530.
32. Congress found that the ad hoc balancing test provided no concrete guidance to either the
defendant or the criminal justice system in determining whether speedy trial rights had been
violated, but merely reinforced "the legitimacy of delay." 1974 House Report, supra note 2, at 11,
reprinted in [1974] U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News at 7404-05. See generally 91 Harv. L. Rev.
1925 (1978).

33. ABA Standards, supra note 29.
34. Id. § 2.1, Commentary at 14-16; see Poulos & Coleman, Speedy Trial, Slow Implementation: The ABA Standards in Search of a Statehiouse, 28 Hastings L.J. 357, 365 (1976).
35. ABA Standards, supra note 29, § 2.1; see Poulos & Coleman, supra note 34, at 365.
36. ABA Standards, supra note 29, § 2.2; see Poulos & Coleman, supra note 34, at 365.
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certain specified events, 37 but required the court to consider the public's interest in determining whether to grant a continuance. 38 The ABA maintained
that a strict excludable time policy was crucial to the success of any speedy
trial legislation, and that courts should grant continuances only upon a showing of good cause and for reasonable periods. 39 As a further deterrent to
delay, the Standards provided that violations of the time limits would
result in
40
dismissal of the charges against the defendant with prejudice.
The ABA Standards, however, were largely ignored by the states. 4 1 Their
impact upon federal tribunals was also negligible until 1971, when the United
States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit used them as a model for its
own standards. 42 The court announced that, as of July 5, 1971, the Second
Circuit Rules Regarding Prompt Disposition of Criminal Cases would govern
all district court criminal proceedings in the circuit. 43 The Second Circuit
Rules required that the Government must be ready for trial within six months
from arrest, service of summons, detention, or filing of complaint or formal
charge against the defendant, whichever occurred earliest. 44 As with the ABA
Standards, the Rules provided for excludable periods of delay 45 and dismissal
with prejudice as the sole sanction for violation. 46 In addition, demand by the
defendant was not necessary to trigger the operation of the limits, but failure
37. ABA Standards, supra note 29, § 2.3. Excludable delays included such events as other
proceedings against the defendant, id. § 2.3(a), and absence or unavailability of the defendant.
Id. § 2.3(e).
38. Id. § 1.3; see Poulos & Coleman, supra note 34, at 365. Continuances could be granted to
alleviate congestion of the trial docket if attributable to "exceptional circumstances," such as the
unavailability of the prosecutor or the judge at the time trial is scheduled. ABA Standards, supra
note 29, § 2.3(b), Commentary at 27-28. Delays resulting from crowded court dockets alone,
however, were not excludable. Id.; see Poulos & Coleman, supra note 34, at 374-76.
39. ABA Standards, supra note 29, § 1.3; see Poulos & Coleman, supra note 34, at 371-73.
40. ABA Standards, supra note 29, § 4.1; see Poulos & Coleman, supra note 34, at 366,
376-77. Dismissal is also the remedy for violation of the sixth amendment speedy trial guarantee.
E.g., Strunk v. United States, 412 U.S. 434, 438-40 (1973). The ABA Standards declared that a
defendant's failure to move for dismissal prior to trial or entry of a guilty plea would constitute a
waiver of that right. ABA Standards, supra note 29, § 4.1; see Poulos & Coleman, supra note 34,
at 366-67.
41. See Note, Poulos & Coleman, supra note 34, at 378; Speedy Trial: A ConstitutionalRight
in Search of Definition, 61 Geo. L.J. 657, 662 (1973) [hereinafter cited as ConstitutionalRight),
42. In United States ex rel. Frizer v. McMann, 437 F.2d 1312 (2d Cir. 1971) (en bane), the
court found that a more precise delineation of the speedy trial guarantee was necessary both to
safeguard society's interest in prompt dispositions and to induce more effective calendar control.
It observed that resolutions of disputes over the length of and justifications for delay In each case
had increased state and federal court congestion to a level of alarming proportions. Id. at
1314-15. That congestion had in turn contributed to the incidences of delay, further Infringing
upon the defendant's and the public's right to a speedy trial. The court thus deemed the creation
of specific standards essential. Id. at 1317.
43. Id. at 1317-18. The Rules are reprinted in 8B Moore's Federal Practice
48,03[l], at
48-11 n.1 (2d ed. 1972), and will be cited hereinafter as 2d Cir. R. In 1973, the Rules were
superseded by the district court plans for speedy trials, which were adopted pursuant to Fed. R.
Crim. P. 50(b). See note 53 infra and accompanying text.
44. 2d Cir. R. 4.
45. Id. R. 5; see Vital Right, supra note 1, at 355-56.
46. 2d Cir. R. 4; see Vital Right, supra note 1, at 355, 358.
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to move for discharge
prior to trial or guilty plea constituted a waiver of the
47
right to dismissal.
Despite their stated objectives, the Second Circuit Rules were only marginally effective in breaking the logjam of pretrial delays. Most disappointing
was the "notice of readiness" provision of rule 4, which required that the
Government file within the appropriate six month period a notice with the
court that it was ready to proceed to trial. Unless the court called the case for
trial promptly after the notice was filed--and there was no incentive to do
so-trials could begin eight or more months after arrest or indictment, rather
than the six months presumably intended by the Rules. 48 Furthermore, rule
5(h) permitted delay in instances not enumerated in the other excludable time
4 9
provisions, if the delay was "occasioned by exceptional circumstances.1
Several Second Circuit panels applied this rule strictly, noting that an overly
broad reading of the provision would subvert the goal of prompt dispositions. 50 Other decisions in the circuit, however, intimated that court congestion was an excusable event;5 ' one judge suggested that the Rules could not
penalize a court for its crowded calendars. 52 These loopholes prevented the
Rules from achieving the degree of success in eliminating delays that the
Second Circuit had desired.
At about the same time as the Second Circuit Rules were instituted, the
Judicial Conference of the United States was drafting its own speedy trial
proposals which would be applicable in all federal courts. One of these proposals was adopted as Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 50(b), and became
effective on October 1, 1972. 53 It required that all districts prepare and adopt
plans for the prompt disposition of criminal cases,5 4 and conduct continuing
47. 2d Cir. R 8.
48. See United States v. Pierro, 478 F.2d 386, 389 (2d Cir. 1973); Vital Right, supra note 1,at
355. See also 1974 Senate Report, supra note 2, at 22.
49. 2d Cir. R. 5(h).
50. The Second Circuit interpreted "exceptional circumstances" to exclude understaffed court
conditions, United States v. Bowman, 493 F.2d 594, 597 (2d Cir. 1974), and turnovers in
personnel causing periodic understaffing in the United States Attorney's Office. United States v.
Favaloro, 493 F.2d 623, 625 (2d Cir. 1974).
51. See United States v. Counts, 471 F.2d 422, 427 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 411 U.S. 935
(1973). Under rule 6, delays traced to the courts could result in dismissal of all charges against the
defendant. See United States v. Roemer, 514 F.2d 1377, 1382 (2d Cir. 1975); United States v.
Drummond, 511 F.2d 1049, 1054 (2d Cir. 1975); United States v. Didier, 401 F. Supp. 4, 8
(S.D.N.Y. 1975). Rule 6, however, applied only to trials and retrials ordered by appellate courts.
See Vital Right, supra note 1, at 357-61.
52. United States v. Infanti, 474 F.2d 522, 527-28 (2d Cir. 1973).
53. Fed. R Crim. P. 50(b); see 1974 House Hearings, supra note 2, at 1091; Frase, supra note
1, at 675 n.68. Rule 50(b) was inspired by the Second Circuit Rules. 1974 Senate Report, supra
note 2, at 18. Justice Douglas, dissenting from the Supreme Court's adoption of the rule, stated:
"There may be several better ways of achieving [speedy trials]. This Court is not able to make
discerning judgments between various policy choices wher. the relative advantage of the several
alternatives depends on extensive fact finding. That is a 'legislative' determination. Under our
constitutional system that function is left to the Congress with approval or veto by the President."
Amendments to Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, 406 U.S. 979, 981-82 (Douglas, J.,dissenting); see 1974 Senate Report, supra note 2, at 19.
54. Fed. R Crim. P. 50(b); 1974 House Hearings, supra note 2, at 1091. The plans which the
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studies of the administration of criminal justice. 5 Pursuant to rule 50(b), the
Administrative Office of the United States Courts prepared5 6and submitted a
model plan to the district courts for their consideration.
57
Each district, however, was free to determine the applicable time limits.
As the rule authorized no sanctions for noncompliance other than the release
of defendants in custody,58 it offered little motivation to improve court
administration. The greatest drawback of the rule was the lack of uniformity
created by the establishment of differing time limits by each jurisdiction.
Instead of implementing methods to insure speedy trials and to relieve court
congestion, busier districts merely adopted time limits that reflected their
existing rate of criminal caseload movement. s9 In those districts the rule did
nothing more than encourage "the perpetuation of the status quo. ' '60
Thus, despite all prior rules and plans to encourage more rapid disposition
of criminal cases, pretrial delays and court congestion remained a major
problem, 61 and federal courts exhibited little motivation to rectify the situation. The need for more specific guidelines became even more acute in view of
recent studies establishing that long delays increased the likelihood of pretrial
recidivism. 62 Prompted largely by these considerations, 63 Congress enacted the
Speedy Trial Act of 1974.64
districts in the Second Circuit consequently adopted were based largely upon the already
functioning Second Circuit Rules. Id. at 1092.
55. Such studies were to be submitted to a reviewing panel for approval, and, if approved,
were to be forwarded to the Administrative Office. The Administrative Office was required to
report annually on the operation of such plans to the Judicial Conference of the United States.
1974 Senate Report, supra note 2, at 18. Rule 50(b), however, did not allow courts to request
additional resources needed to achieve its goals. Because districts were allowed to set their own
limits, such a provision was probably unnecessary.
56. 1974 House Report, supra note 2, at 12, reprinted in [1974] U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News
at 7405.
57. Id. at 12, reprinted in (19741 U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News at 7406. The model plan
prepared by the Administrative Office and submitted to the district courts contained tripartite
limits similar to those established by the Speedy Trial Act The Administrative Office suggested a
20 day indictment-to-arraignment period for defendants in custody, and a 30 day period for
defendants released prior to trial. The time between arraignment and trial was 90 days for
defendants in custody, and 180 days for released defendants. Id., reprinted in [1974] U.S. Code
Cong. & Ad. News at 7406; 1974 House Hearings, supra note 2, at 276. The 180 day period,
however, was measured from indictment and not arrest. As the Senate Committee on the
Judiciary noted: "[T]here may be months additional delay between arrest and indictment in a
majority of Federal criminal cases. Thus the 50(b) model plan promise[d] little improvement In
overall delay." 1974 Senate Report, supra note 2, at 19.
58. 1974 House Report, supra note 2, at 12, reprintedin [1974] U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News
at 7406.
59. Id. at 13, reprinted in [1974] U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News at 7406. The Subcommittee
on Crime of the House Judiciary Committee noted as an example that the time limits set in
Georgia varied from 30 days from arraignment to trial in the Middle District, to 180 days In the
Northern District. Id.
60. Id.; see Suggestion, supra note 1, at 909-10.
61. See 1974 House Report, supra note 2, at 17, reprinted in [1974] U.S. Code Cong. & Ad.
News at 7410; 1974 House Hearings, supra note 2, at 196-97, 511.
62. See Ervin, Preventive Detention: An EmpiricalAnalysis-Foreword: Preventive Detention-A Step Backwardfor CriminalJustice, 6 Harv. C.R.-C.L. L. Rev. 291, 294-95 (1970). A
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B. The Speedy Trial Act
The passage of the Act represents the most determined effort to enforce the
public's right to speedy criminal dispositions. Although the statute codified

various provisions of prior schemes, it contains several innovations designed
to promote the societal interest more effectively. Under its permanent time

provisions, the Act requires that the defendant be indicted within thirty days
of arrest or service of summons; 65 that the defendant be arraigned within ten

days of indictment; 66 and that, when a plea of not guilty is entered, the
defendant be tried within sixty days of arraignment. 67 If indictment precedes

arrest, the ten day period to arraignment does not begin until the defendant's

69
68
first appearance before the judicial officer. As under the previous rules,
the time limits begin to run regardless of the defendant's failure to demand
trial, 70 reflecting the importance attached by Congress to enforcement of the
public's right to speedy trials.
Although the tripartite limits are much shorter than those under prior standards, other provisions mirror those of its predecessors, and were designed
primarily to mitigate the comparatively harsh demands of the Act. As under
the Second Circuit Rules, 71 certain designated delays toll the running of the
time limits. 72 To date, the most common events justifying a continuance

study conducted by the National Bureau of Standards in 1970 and presented to Congress indicated that if a defendant were released before trial, the likelihood that he would engage in
criminal activity increased significantly if he were not brought to trial within 60 day. 1974 Senate
Report, supra note 2, at 8. The Committee was also influenced by the report of the National
Advisory Commission on Criminal Justice Standards and Goals, which concluded that faster and
more efficient criminal processing would increase the deterrent effect of the criminal law, aid
rehabilitation, and reduce crime. 1974 House Report, supra note 2, at 16, reprinted in [19741 U.S.
Code Cong. & Ad. News at 7409. But see Frase, supra note 1, at 681 (the precise time limits
chosen by Congress were arbitrary and not realistic).
63. 1974 Senate Report, supra note 2, at 7-8; 1974 House Hearings, supra note 2, at 5.
64.
65.

Pub. L. No. 93-619, § 101, 88 Star. 2076 (1975).
18 U.S.C. § 3161(b) (1976).

66. Id. § 3161(c).
67.

Id.; see Frase, supra note 1, at 681 n.88.

68. 18 U.S.C. § 3161(c) (1976).
69. See notes 36, 47 supra and accompanying text.
70. 18 U.S.C. § 3161(b)-(c) (1976). The time limits begin to run automatically upon arrest,
summons or, where indictment precedes arrest, the defendant's first appearance. See Frase, supra
note 1, at 669.
71. See note 49 supra and accompanying text.
72. 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h) (I)-(7) (1976) provides: "The following periods of delay are excluded
in computing the time within which the trial of the defendant must commence:
(1) any period of delay resulting from other proceedings concerning the defendant, such as:
(A) examinations and hearings on mental competency or physical incapacity,
(B) examinations under 28 U.S.C. § 2902,
(C) trials of other charges against the defendant,
(D) interlocutory appeals,
(E) hearings on pretrial motions,
(F) transfer proceedings,
(G) motions actually under advisement;"
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under these provisions are hearings on pretrial motions, motions held under
7
advisement, and the unavailability of the defendant or an essential witness.
In addition, in those instances not specifically covered by the other excludable time provisions, section 3161(h)(8) of the Act provides that continuances
may be granted at the discretion of the trial judge (upon his own motion or
that of counsel) whenever the "the ends of justice served by taking such action
74
outweigh the best interest of the public and the defendant in a speedy trial."
The Senate Report called this provision "the heart of the speedy trial scheme"
established by the Act, because it imbued the strict
time limits with enough
75
flexibility to make compliance "a realistic goal." 1
Aware, however, that too much flexibility would defeat the statutory objective, Congress expressly provided that a continuance shall not be available
when the delay is attributable to "general congestion of the court's calendar,
or lack of diligent preparation or failure to obtain available witnesses on the
part of the attorney for the Government."7 6 The general congestion provision
is especially significant for its elimination of the loopholes in the Second
Circuit Rules; 7 7 backlogged dockets are no longer to be an excuse for delay.
The Act, however, contains several other provisions designed to mitigate
the stringency of its short time limits, some of which are not found in prior
schemes. One salient example of the flexibility intended by the framers is
found in section 3162(a)(1). It provides that, under the permanent limits,
when charges against the defendant must be dismissed upon violation, 78 the
trial court in its discretion shall determine whether the dismissal should be
with or without prejudice. 7 9 The factors to be considered in that decision are
the seriousness of the offense, the circumstances of the case that led to the
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
(6)

deferred prosecutions;
absence or unavailability of the defendant or essential witnesses;
defendant's mental incompetency or physical inability to stand trial;
a reasonable period for treatment pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2902;
time between dismissal of the indictment or information upon motion of the attorney for
the government and the re-filing of the same charge against the defendant; and
(7) joinder of the defendant with a co-defendant as to whom the time for trial has not run and
no motion for severance has been granted."
73. 1978 Speedy Trial Report, supra note 10, at 15. During the 12 month period ending June
30, 1978, hearings on pretrial motions, motions held under advisement, and unavailability of the
defendant or essential witnesses accounted for 34%, 18.8%, and 11.3%, respectively, of all
excludable delays. Id.
74. 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(8)(A) (1976); see 1974 Senate Report, supra note 2, at 39. Originally, a
blanket exception was proposed for certain classes of complex cases, such as antitrust and organized crime conspiracies. Because of the difficulty of labeling actions as simple or complex,
however, Congress finally deemed the case-by-case approach of § 3161(h)(8) a more appropriate
test. Id. See generally Frase, supra note 1, at 698-704. The interests of justice exclusion constituted 16.2% of the 14,301 incidents of excludable delay reported by all districts in the year ending
June 30, 1978. 1978 Speedy Trial Report, supra note 10, at 15.
75. 1974 Senate Report, supra note 2, at 39; see Frse, supra note 1, at 698.
76. 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(8)(C) (1976).
77. See notes 48-52 supra and accompanying text.
78. 18 U.S.C. § 3163(c) (1976). For discussion of the dismissal sanction, see Frase, supra note
1, at 704-08.
79. 18 U.S.C. § 3162(a)(1) (1976).
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dismissal, and the impact of reprosecution on the administration of the Act
and justice.80
The Act is also unique in its concern that the districts' compliance with the
permanent limits does not cause major disruptions of their calendars or drains
on their resources. 8 1 It established detailed planning procedures, under which
each district submitted plans to the Administrative Office of the United States
Courts.8 2 The plans summarize the experiences of the districts under the
phase-in limits, report difficulties encountered, and include recommendations
for legislative changes or additional appropriations needed to achieve
compliance with the final strictures.8 3 Finally, in the event that a district
cannot comply with the permanent time limits, the Act permits the Judicial
Conference, upon application of the judicial council of the appropriate circuit,
to suspend the
indictment-to-arraignment and arraignment-to-trial intervals
84
for one year.
To date, most districts predict that they will be able to achieve substantial
compliance with the permanent limits. 85 Although many of the final district
plans propose that the tripartite limits, especially the arraignment-to-trial
period, should be lengthened, apparently no district has yet applied for the
one year emergency suspension. 86 Despite the flexibility with which Congress
intended the public's right to prompt dispositions be implemented, however,
most districts allege that the costs of compliance are stiff. 87 Accordingly,
determination of the accuracy of those allegations is a crucial prerequisite to
Congress' decision whether to lengthen the Act's time strictures.
80. Id. Dismissal with prejudice bars any future prosecution against the defendant for offenses which were or reasonably should have been known at the time of dismissal. 1974 House
Report, supra note 2, at 37, reprinted in [1974] U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News at 7429. If,
however, the Government presents compelling evidence that failure to meet the time limits ,.-as
caused by exceptional circumstances which the Government and the court could not have foreseen or avoided, it can reinstate charges; e.g., where the defendant or his counsel perjured himself
in alleging circumstances which led the judge to dismiss charges. 1974 Senate Report, supra note
2, at 43.
81. See 1974 House Report, supra note 2, at 25, 32, reprinted in [1974] U.S. Code Cong. &
Ad. News at 7418, 7425; note 55 supra.
82. 18 U.S.C. § 3165 (1976); see note 55 supra and accompanying text. The Administrative
Office in turn compiles the district reports and statistical information concerning the Act's impact
and effectiveness and progress of the Act and periodically reports to Congress. 18 U.S.C. § 3167
(1976).
83. 18 U.S.C. § 3167(b) (1976); see 1974 House Report, supra note 2, at 24-25, reprinted in
[1974] U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News at 7418.
84. 18 U.S.C. § 3174 (1976); see 1974 House Report, supra note 2, at 26, 42-44, reprinted in
[1974] U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News at 7419, 7434-37. Under the "judicial emergenc) ' provision,
the arraignment-to-trial limit may not be increased to exceed 180 days. The indictment-toarraignment period, however, is subject to no limitation on its extension in case of suspension.
For a detailed treatment of this section, see Frase, supra note 1, at 708-11.
85. 1978 Speedy Trial Report, supra note 10, at 1. Available data indicates that, in over 90,
of the cases, the courts have been able to operate within the transitional time limits. Id.
86. Id. at A 1. Although the Administrative Office reported that a few districts requested
amendment of the Act regarding the procedural grounds for obtaining a suspension of the time
limits, no application for a suspension was noted. Id. at A 6.
87. Id. at 13-15.
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METHODOLOGY OF THE STUDY

To ascertain the effect of the Act 8 in the Districts of Connecticut, New
Jersey and Eastern New York,8 9 this study was launched in August 1978.
Varying numbers of district judges, assistant United States Attorneys, and
defense attorneys were interviewed in each of the three districts. 90 Interviews
were conducted with each judge whose schedule permitted and who had
sufficient experience under the phase-in limits. 9' Four judges in Connecticut,
eight in New Jersey, and six in Eastern New York consented to questioning.
Similarly, all available, experienced prosecutors-five in Connecticut and ten
in New Jersey-participated in the study. The United States Attorney's Office
for the Eastern District of New York approved only one interview; the prosecutor interviewed, however, was authorized to speak on behalf of his colleagues.
Four defense attorneys in Connecticut, six in New Jersey, and ten in the
Eastern District of New York were interviewed. The attorneys' names were
obtained from the docket sheets of the district courts and through recommendations of other interviewees. Again, care was taken to interview those lawyers with the most experience under the Act. Unfortunately, many of the
attorneys with the busiest schedules in federal court were consequently unavailable for interviews. The study found little indication, however, that the
experiences of those lawyers who were questioned do not adequately reflect
the difficulties faced under the transitional limits.
The interviews were broad in scope. 92 Each individual was encouraged to
relate his 93 experiences under the Act and his recommendations, if any, for its
future implementation. Although separate lists of direct questions were em88. As the permanent limits and sanctions are not effective until July 1, 1979, any study
conducted before that time in the District of New Jersey and the Eastern District of New York,
which did not immediately adopt the permanent limits, cannot reflect the full impact of the Act
with complete accuracy. The District of Connecticut, however, has applied the permanent time
limits of the Act since July 1, 1976, District of Connecticut, Final Plan for the Prompt Disposition
of Criminal Cases HI-2 to -S(1978) [hereinafter cited as D. Conn. Final Plan], and to that extent
may provide a more reliable base for prediction.
89. Both the District of Connecticut and the Eastern District of New York are in the Second
Circuit. The Eastern District of New York encompasses Brooklyn, Queens, Staten Island, and
Nassau and Suffolk Counties. The District of New Jersey is part of the Third Circuit.
Despite its proximity to the Fordham University School of Law, the Southern District of New
York was not chosen as a subject for study, primarily because of its unusually large size. See 1978
Administrative Office Report, supra note 14, at 66. In addition, the district has been the target of
at least two other recent analyses. See Speedy Trial Planning Group, Southern District of New
York, Report on Problems in Implementing the Speedy Trial Act of 1974 (May 6, 1977)
[hereinafter cited as Report on Problems]; Southern District Evaluation, supra note 1.

90. Although the accuracy of interview references has been carefully checked by the editors of
the Fordham Law Review, no citations are provided in order to preserve the promise of
confidentiality given to each person interviewed.
91. Some judges declined interviews because of their senior status, or because their tenures on
the bench were too short to acquaint them sufficiently with the Act.
92. All interviews took place at the office of the interviewees and lasted from one to two
hours. Although some interviews were tape-recorded, notes were taken in most interviews and
immediately transcribed to avoid any potential inhibitions that might be caused by the presence
of recording devices. Interview transcripts are on file at the Fordham Law Review, but are
unavailable for public inspection.
93. The male pronoun will be used to preserve anonymity.
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ployed for each of the three groups, 94 all were encouraged to recount specific
instances that would illustrate their answers. In addition, all interviewees
were asked whether their experiences differed prior to the implementation of
the transitional limits. Whenever possible, answers were compared with
available statistical information. Previous experiences and the statistical comparisons were employed to distinguish those problems created or exacerbated
by the Act from those upon which the Act has had little apparent effect.
A comparison of several districts' operation under the Act was deemed to be
the most profitable method of gauging its effects; comparative analysis lessens
the possibility that the conclusions of the study rest on atypical or unrepresentative foundations. Although no one district is a microcosm of national experience, the districts chosen are sufficiently diverse to highlight most problems
that have been encountered during the phase-in period.
All three districts varied in their adherence to the transitional limits. Connecticut elected to adopt the permanent limits immediately on July 1, 19 7 6 .9s
New Jersey adhered to the transitional limits during the first eighteen months
of operation under the Act, but switched to the final limits on January 1,
1978.96 Eastern New York, preferring the gradually reducing limits of the
phase-in period, has not yet adopted the permanent limits.97 In addition, the
districts differ as to the makeup of their yearly 98 filings. While Connecticut
has a predominantly civil calendar with few criminal actions, 99 large numbers
of criminal actions were filed in Eastern New York and New Jersey during
the phase-in period of the Act.' 00
Moreover, the districts show considerable variance with respect to
caseload per authorized judgeship.' 0 ' While New Jersey's caseload, as measured against national figures,1 ° 2 is average, 0 3 Connecticut's is relatively
94. The questions are set forth in the Appendix.
95. D. Conn. Final Plan, supra note 88, at Irn-I; see note 88 supra and accompanying text.
96. District of New Jersey, Final Plan for Prompt Disposition of Criminal Cases 30 (1978)
[hereinafter cited as D.N.J. Final Plan]. Statistical information for the latter period is not yet
available.
97. Eastern District of New York, Final Plan for Prompt Disposition of Criminal Cases 1I1.1
to -17 (1978) [hereinafter cited as E.D.N.Y. Final Plan].
98. The term "year' will be used throughout this article to refer to a fiscal year beginning on
July 1 and ending on June 30.
99. See Administrative Office of the United States Courts, Management Statistics for United
States Courts 21 (1978) [hereinafter cited as 1978 Management Statistics].
100. Id. at 23, 30.
101. Comparison of the districts on a per judgeship basis, however, may have its own
inadequacies. The number of authorized judgeships does not account for vacancies. 1978 Management Statistics, supra note 99, at 21, 23, 30. The actual number of cases assigned to each
active judge would be higher if the district experienced a vacancy. In fact, judicial seats have
been unoccupied for certain periods in Eastern New York and Connecticut since the effective
date of the transitional limits. See id. at 21, 23. Active judges in those districts, therefore, may
have been busier than the statistics reveal. On the other hand, the statistics do not account for the
number of active senior judges. Id. at d. Each of the districts studied has at least two active
senior judges. See Administrative Office of the United States Courts, United States Court Directory 41, 84, 89 (1978). These judges may help to reduce the pressures of compliance with the Act's
limits, and perhaps partially offset the added burdens resulting from judicial vacancies.
102. The national average of criminal and civil filings per authorized judgeship %-s411 in
1977 and 417 in 1978. 1978 Management Statistics, supra note 99, at 129.
103. New Jersey reported 352 filings per judge in 1977 and 375 in 1978. Id. at 30.
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high. 1 0 4 On the other hand, Eastern New York's caseload per judgeship is
smaller than most federal jurisdictions, despite the large number of cases
filed. 10- If the cases are weighted to indicate relative degrees of complexity, 106
Connecticut also shows the highest weighted caseload per judge of the three
districts, 10 7 and indeed has one of the highest figures nationwide.108 Both
Eastern New York and New Jersey rank behind most other districts in this

category. 109
Im.

EFFECT ON CIVIL LITIGATION

Although the Act provides that priority should be given to the acceleration
of criminal cases, 110 it cautions that courts should "seek to avoid . . . prejudice to the prompt disposition of civil litigation.""' Yet, as the permanent
sanctions approach, almost half of the districts report increased neglect of
their civil calendars. 1 12 Chief Justice Burger, prominent among advocates of
judicial efficiency, recently proclaimed that the Act "has required a virtual
moratorium of civil cases in some districts.' 1 13 His call for amendment echoes
104. The filings per authorized judgeship in Connecticut reached 421 in 1977 and 458 in 1978.
Id. at 21.
105. The figures in Eastern New York were 362 filings per authorized judgeship in 1977 and
359 in 1978. Id. at 23.
106. Weighted filings reflect an attempt by the Adminmstrative Office to assess a district's total
filings in terms of case complexity. Civil cases are weighted based upon the amount of court trial
time in fiscal 1963 and 1964 for that particular type of action divided by the total number of
terminations reported for this type of action. Thus, patent cases accounted for 6% of the trial
effort by judges, but only 1.5% of total terminations; 6.0 divided by 1.5 yields a weight of 4.0 for
all patent cases. Judicial Conference of the United States, Annual Report 157 (1964). Criminal
actions are weighted by the same procedure, except that each defendant in a criminal action is
accorded an additional weight of .60 to assure that multidefendant criminal actions are weighted
more heavily than single defendant actions. Id. at 160.
107. In 1977, Connecticut reported 452 weighted filings per judge and in 1978 this figure
reached 486. 1978 Management Statistics, supra note 99, at 21. In contrast, the figures for the
weighted filings per judge in New Jersey were 416 in 1977 and 412 in 1978. Id. at 30. In Eastern
New York, the figures were 405 in 1977 and 371 in 1978. Id. at 23.
108. In terms of weighted caseloads, only 28 districts had a higher average in 1978. Id. at 21.
109. New Jersey was ranked fifty-fifth in 1978. Id. at 30. Eastern New York was sixtyeighth. Id. at 23.
110. 18 U.S.C. § 3165(b) (1976); see Fed. R. Crim. P. 50(b).
111. 18 U.S.C. § 3165(b) (1976). This language appears to have been derived predominantly
from the additions to the bill proposed by Professor Daniel J. Freed of the Yale Law School.
Letter from Daniel J. Freed to Senator Ervin (Aug. 6, 1973), reprinted in Speedy Trial: Hearings
on S. 754 Before the Subcomm. on ConstitutionalRights of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary,
93d Cong., Ist Sess. 154 (1973) [hereinafter cited as 1973 Senate Hearings].The earlier draft of
the bill was devoid of any reference to civil litigation. See S. 754, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. § 3165 (b)
(1973); 1973 Senate Hearings, supra, at 23. The final bill, however, contained the exact wording
of Professor Freed's proposal. See 1974 House Hearings, supra note 2, at 259 (statement of Prof.
Freed).
112. Forty-four of the planning groups reported increased delay in the disposition of civil
cases. 1978 Speedy Trial Report, supra note 10, at 13. The Second Circuit, however, has not
reported major difficulties with its civil calendar. 65 A.B.A. J. 23 (1979).
113. Address by Warren E. Burger, Chief Justice of the United States, American Bar Association Midyear Meeting (Feb. 11, 1979).
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the concern of several commentators that relaxation of the time limits is
essential to avoid further detriment to civil litigants." 4
The most common fear is that the greater time devoted to criminal matters
will spur substantial increases in the number of civil cases remaining on the
courts' calendars at the close of each fiscal year (the pending rate)." s The
already alarming levels of congestion in federal courts underscore the necessity of avoiding additional backlogs."16 Furthermore, courts' neglect of civil
cases will force judges to encourage, and civil litigants to accept, more settlements as the only remaining method to end lawsuits quickly. 1t7 Settlement,
insofar as it precludes the opportunity of determining a case on the merits,
may arguably be an undesirable consecluence of the shorter limits. In addition, it has been predicted that the increased pressures to dispose of criminal
matters will lead judges to reassign more civil and criminal cases.1t 8 When a
case is reassigned, time is wasted as the new judge familiarizes himself with
often complex legal and factual disputes. In short, contrary to the congressional directive, operation of the time limits could only operate to the
detriment of civil litigation.
Experience in the three districts surveyed, however, reveals that the Act
114. Black, supra note 1, at 251; Frase, supra note I, at 702-03; Lacey, supra note 1, at 8, 16;
Suggestion, supra note 1, at 934; Nat'l L.J., Mar. 12, 1979, at 5, col. 1. The Southern District of
New York has expressed fears that the Act would unduly interfere with the processes of long civil
trials. Report on Problems, supra note 89, at S.
Several critics in the debates prior to passage of the Act reported that even under less stringent
speedy trial schemes civil litigants had suffered. "1200 civil cases are now awaiting trial whereas
the court was current on its civil docket before [Rule 50(b) vas adopted]." 1974 House Hearings,
supra note 2, at 206 (statement of James L. Treece). "[W]e are giving priority to the defendants in
criminal cases, but we are doing it at the expense of the civil docket." Id. at 246 (statement of
Judge Feikens). "[Tlhe yeoman efforts of our District Courts to speed up the trials in criminal
matters has [sic] resulted in ... the shunting aside of virtually all civil matters .... " Id. at 336
(statement of Ivan E. Barris). "[E]ven under the pressures of the Rule 50(b) plan, it has become
difficult to process civil cases and so difficult in fact that they have had to declare a virtual
moratorium on civil cases." Id. at 370 (statement of Judge Zirpoli).
115. See 1978 Speedy Trial Report, supra note 10, at 13; Suggestion, supra note 1,at 914-15;
D. Conn. Final Plan, supra note 88, at 111-4; D.N.J. Final Plan, supra note 96, at 30-31,
E.D.N.Y. Final Plan, supra note 97, at MI-5. "[T]he Speedy Trial Act has made calendar control
even more difficult than it was previously." United States v. Wendy, 575 F.2d 1025, 1031 t2d
Cir. 1978). "I also fail to see how, with the present number of judges assigned to this district, how
[sic] the Court will be able to try all criminal cases unless we just stop trying civil cases and
devote all our attention to criminal matters." United States v. Clendening, 526 F.2d 842, 845 (5th
Cir. 1976) (quoting lower court record).
116. 1978 Speedy Trial Report, supra note 10, at 13. "[A] civil case in the federal court system
may not come to trial for many months or even years after it is filed." Shelak v. White Motor Co.,
581 F.2d 1155, 1158 n.5 (5th Cir. 1978).
117. Lacey, The Judge's Role in the Settlement of Civil Suits 4 (Federal Judicial Center,
Educ. and Training Series 1977). The Act may have an indirect effect on the number of civil
filings. If the greater time spent on criminal matters leads to excessive delays on the civil dockets,
it may not be practical for a plaintiff to sue in federal court when a similar action can be
maintained in state court. This same judge has noted that the Act will make federal civil practice
quite unappealing to many attorneys, who will more often resort to state courts whenever
possible. Id. at 7.
118. "[Llarge numbers of such reassignments would also seriously impair the effectiveness of
the individual calendar system." Frase, supra note 1, at 702; see Lacey, supra note 1, at 6.
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may not be as culpable on these counts as its detractors have charged. While
the majority of judges interviewed agreed that the number of civil cases on
their dockets was increasing yearly, a substantial number declared that the
Act was not a factor in the status of their dockets. 119 Moreover, that the rise
in the civil pending rate is not entirely, if at all, the fault of the Act is
supported by an analysis of the caseloads in the three districts.
A.

Civil Pending Rates

Theoretically, as the time limits for disposition of criminal matters shorten,
more judicial resources will be allocated to the criminal dockets. 120 The corresponding reduction in time addressed to civil matters will cause decreases in
the number of civil cases terminated and consequently higher pending
caseloads. 121 Accordingly, pending caseloads have formed the basis of several
critical assessments of the Act, 122 including the final plans for all three districts studied. 123 The pending caseload, however, is only the first step in a
review of the Act's effect on civil litigation; a complete analysis requires a
study of filing and termination rates. For even if the rate of terminations is
increasing, the pending civil caseload will increase as long as the rate of civil
filings increases faster than the rate of terminations. 124 Thus, although judges
acting under the Act's constraints may have improved their efficiency in terminating both civil and criminal cases, a simultaneous rise in the number of
cases filed might nevertheless exacerbate court congestion. Since the Act presumably has no effect on the number of civil actions instituted, 12S it could
not, in that instance, be blamed for an increase in the number of pending civil
matters.
Graph 1 indicates the number of pending civil cases in each district for the
119. See notes 152-55 infra and accompanying text.
120. Because each individual defendant must be brought to trial within a short time, a judge
must devote considerable attention to his criminal dockets to ensure that the time limits for any
one defendant do not expire.
121. If 100 civil cases are filed during the year, and the district judges terminate 80, 20 cases
are carried over to the following year as pending matters. If in that following year the judges
manage to terminate only 70 cases while an additional 100 cases are filed, then the pending
caseload would be 50-an increase of 30 cases, or 150%.
122. 1978 Speedy Trial Report, supra note 10, at 13; see Address by Warren E. Burger, Chief
Justice of the United States, American Bar Association Midyear Meeting (Feb. 11, 1979); note
115 supra.
123. The District of Connecticut planning group has reported gains in the dispositions of
criminal matters but at a cost to the civil docket in terms of pending matters. D. Conn. Final Plan,
supra note 88, at 111-4. Although New Jersey has decreased its civil backlogs in the past two
years, it fears that "[wlith civil filings for the year beginning July 1, 1977, running approximately
8.0% ahead of the previous 12-month period, it is difficult to imagine any significant reduction
occurring in the civil caseload if the court continues to expend the same amount of time or
increases its efforts on the criminal side in order to meet the requirements of the Speedy Trial
Act." D.N.J. Final Plan, supra note 96, at 31. This same fear was expressed by the planning
group in Eastern New York. "[T]he backlog will increase at a more rapid rate, when, in 1979,
100% compliance with the Speedy Trial Act will be required." E.D.N.Y. Final Plan, supra note
97, at 111-6.
124. For example, assume that filings in one year exceed those of the previous year by 150. If
the district terminates 100 cases more than in the previous year, 50 cases remain. Thus, the
pending civil caseload increases by 50, regardless of the increased terminations.
125. See note 117 supra.
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years 1975 to 1978.126 The area to the left of the bold line indicates the period
prior to July 1, 1976, the effective date of the first transitional time limits.
In conformity with prior trends, 127 the number of civil cases pending in
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126. Graphs 1, 2, and 3 were prepared from the following sources: 1978 Administrative Office
Report, supra note 14, at A-14; Administrative Office of the United States Courts, 1977 Annual
Report of the Director 84 (1977) [hereinafter cited as 1977 Administrative Office Report]; Administrative Office of the United States Courts, 1976 Annual Report of the Director 82 (1976)
[hereinafter cited as 1976 Administrative Office Report].
127. During 1976, one year before implementation of the transitional limits, the number of
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both Eastern New York and Connecticut rose during both years under the
Act. 128 In New Jersey, however, the pending civil caseload dropped during
1977 and increased slightly in 1978.129 From these statistics, it might appear
that the Act has increased civil backlogs in Eastern New York and Connecticut, but has had little effect on New Jersey's calendars. However, the filing
and termination rates for each district in that two year period reveal that the
Act may have spawned few adverse consequences even in Connecticut and
Eastern New York. As illustrated by Graph 2, 30the number of civil actions
filed each year increased in all three districts.'
More importantly, as shown by Graph 3, the districts managed to increase
their terminations during both years under the Act.' 3' Indeed, the decreased
terminations in Connecticut and New Jersey during the year before the time
limits were imposed 32 renders the improvement in judicial efficiency in these
districts under the constraints of the Act even more surprising. Hence, the
congestion in the districts' pending civil dockets is more probably the result of
the rise in civil actions commenced in federal court rather than a neglect of
those cases fostered by the Act.
Connecticut's rise in terminations, and arguably in judicial efficiency, is
even more surprising in view of the district's decision to adopt the Act's
permanent limits immediately.133 Given the comparatively small criminal
caseload in the district, 134 this sudden transition was perhaps less of a shock
than might be expected. Nevertheless, its corresponding improvement in
termination rates for civil matters 3 S indicates that compliance with the Act
after 1979 may not be as prejudicial to civil litigation as has been predicted.
An increase in terminations, however, may not provide a totally reliable
pending civil cases rose 17.1% in Connecticut and 18.8% in Eastern New York. See 1976
Administrative Office Report, supra note 126, at 82.
128. The pending caseload for 1977 was 20.2% higher in Connecticut and 10.7% in Eastern
New York. See 1977 Administrative Office Report, supra note 126, at 84. For 1978, the increases
were 19.5% in Connecticut and 9.1% in Eastern New York. See 1978 Administrative Office
Report, supra note 14, at A-14.
129. After increasing 9.8% in 1976, 1976 Administrative Office Report, supra note 126, at 82,
the pending civil caseload dropped 5.4% in 1977, see 1977 Administrative Office Report, supra
note 126, at 84, and then increased by only 1% in 1978. See 1978 Administrative Office Report,
supra note 14, at A-14.
130. In 1976, filings rose 3.1% in Connecticut, 23.1% in Eastern New York, and 9.2% in
New Jersey. See 1976 Administrative Office Report, supra note 126, at 82. During 1977, filings
increased by 18.6% in Connecticut, 3% in Eastern New York, and 4.9% in New Jersey. See 1977
Administrative Office Report, supra note 126, at 84. In 1978, increases of 12.9% in Connecticut,
5.2% in Eastern New York, and 14.5% in New Jersey were reported. See 1978 Administrative
Office Report, supra note 14, at A-14.
131. In 1976, prior to the Act, terminations decreased 3.8% in Connecticut and 0.9% in New
Jersey, increasing only in Eastern New York, by 12.6%. See 1976 Administrative Office Report,
supra note 126, at 82. Increases of 13.7% in Connecticut, 11.8% in Eastern New York, and
26.3% in New Jersey were reported during 1977. See 1977 Administrative Office Report, supra
note 126, at 84. In 1978, terminations rose by 12% in Connecticut, 6.9% in Eastern New York,
and 6.2% in New Jersey. See 1978 Administrative Office Report, supra note 14, at A-14.
132. See note 131 supra.
133. See notes 88, 95 supra and accompanying text.
134. See note 99 supra and accompanying text.
135. See note 131 supra.
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indication that the Act has had little effect on civil dockets. Terminations
include cases whose disposition requires little court action as well as those that
end only after a full trial on the merits. Indeed, if increased terminations stem
primarily from a rise in the number of actions terminated at early stages of
litigation, it is arguable that the amount of judicial time available for civil
litigation has decreased under the phase-in limits. Specifically, the greater
attention required for criminal cases may have compelled courts to devote less
time to civil trials, and thus either to abandon their civil dockets or to induce
terminations at earlier stages. If so, civil litigants, as a result of either more
insistent prodding by the court or a desire to end their disputes without undue
delay, would be forced to settle more cases. 136
136.

Indeed, the overall number of early terminations increased in all three districts each
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Experience in the three districts, however, suggests that settlements have
not markedly increased under the transitional limits. Three of four judges in
Connecticut and five of six judges in Eastern New York could not specifically
attribute any rises in settlement to the Act. Indeed, two of four judges in
Connecticut and three of six in Eastern New York had not increased
settlements during the years under the Act for any reason. Of those judges
who did induce more settlements, only two would attribute the increases
to the Act. The growing termination rates of these two districts thus are
probably not the result of drastic rises in settlements. On the other hand, one
half of the judges interviewed in New Jersey, the district whose pending civil
year. Table 1 shows the total terminations yearly (except land condemnations and prisoner
petitions) by stage of the proceedings. The table is divided into four categories. The first division
involves those cases terminated without any action by the district court, e.g., voluntary dismissal.
Cases terminated before pretrial include actions disposed of either before or after a complaint has
been answered, but after any motion has been made. For example, assume that a complaint is
unanswered, and the plaintiff moves for a default judgment. If the motion is granted, the
termination would appear in this category. Actions ending during or after pretrial encompass
cases disposed of after at least one pretrial conference has been held. The final category presents
cases terminated either during or after the actual trial. See Administrative Office of the United
States Courts, Guide to Policies and Procedures, Clerk's Manual, Civil Docket Reporting
Instructions (1978).

CIVIL DISPOSITIONS BY YEAR AND STAGE OF TilE PROCEEDINGS
COURT ACTION
TRL%
No Court

Total Court
Action

Action
1976
D.CONN.
D.NJ.
E.D.N.Y.
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1977 11976 11976 1977
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374

640

653

Dunrg or After
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8

74

71
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47
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TABLE 1
The table was prepared from the following sources: 1978 Administrative Office Report, supra
note 14, at A-28; 1977 Administrative Office Report, supra note 126, at A-26; 1976 Administrative
Office Report, supra note 126, at 1-26. The number of total court action dispositions in 1976,
however, is not equal to the sum of the various parts for any district. This error is not explained
in the reports.
Examination of terminations without court action, or before pretrial conferences are held,
indicates that the actual number of cases disposed of in these early stages has increased in each
district. As a percentage of total dispositions, these early dispositions in Connecticut increased
from 78.6% in 1976 to 81.4% in 1977 and to 85.9% in 1978. Eastern New York's percentages rose
from 81.8% in 1976 to 85.7% in 1977, and finally to 87.1% in 1978. However, the percentage of
early dispositions in New Jersey declined from 77.9% in 1976 to 74.4% in 1977 and to 69.1% in
1978.
These increases, however, do not necessarily indicate a rise in the number of settlements. The
statistical information set forth in Table 1 does not reveal the proportion of early case dispositions
that are settlements. In addition, even if the increases reflect a drastic rise in the number of
settlements, whether they were brought about as a result of the Act is at best conjectural.
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caseload showed the greatest improvement, 137 stated that they had stepped up
their settlement procedures and attributed that intensification to the decreased
time available to devote to civil litigants.
It is at least questionable, however, whether those increased settlements
indicate a decline in judicial efficiency in New Jersey. One Connecticut judge
stated that as a result of the time constraints of the Act, he has developed a
new method of civil calendar calls which has increased settlements. On the
first Monday of each month the judge schedules approximately sixty-five civil
cases for calendar call; each call is approximately five to ten minutes in
length. In so doing, the judge ensures that all civil cases are kept active.
When the parties realize that their case is progressing, they are more likely to
settle in order to avoid the prospect of an adverse ruling. In his opinion,
therefore, increased settlements under the Act reflected more efficient management of civil caseloads. Insofar as settlements and other early dispositions
reflect increased court activity and better case administration, they can be
viewed as promoting judicial efficiency. 138 In short, even though the Act may
have forced courts to devote less attention to civil litigation, the time remaining may be well spent.
B. CriminalDocket Activity
A second factor which must be considered in an analysis of civil termination rates is criminal docket activity. The status of a district's criminal calendars may provide some insight into a district's efficiency in disposing of civil
cases. A drop in the number of pending criminal cases, unaccompanied by
changes in the number of criminal filings, arguably demonstrates that judges
are devoting more time to terminating criminal cases under the short limits. 139
A corresponding increase in the number of civil cases terminated in the district would indicate that judges' efficiency in disposing of civil cases has not
diminished despite the greater attention paid to criminal matters. On the
other hand, if criminal filings decline during that period, a simultaneous rise
in civil terminations could not confidently be ascribed to judicial efficiency.
The higher disposition rate would more plausibly stem simply from the
greater time available to devote to civil litigation. Reduced criminal filings
may, therefore, cast doubt on the equation of increased civil terminations
with greater judicial efficiency.
Although the civil calendars of all three districts have shown improvement,
the criminal dockets of Connecticut and Eastern New York have not met
with the same success. Here again pending rates may be misleading. Given
the pressure to dispose of criminal matters imposed by the Act, the pending
0
caseloads might be expected to, and did in fact, decline in these districts. 14
137.
138.

See Graph 1 supra.
To that extent, therefore, the rising levels of early case dispositions in all districts do not

necessarily reflect a neglect of civil calendars. See note 136 supra and accompanying text.
139. Indeed, the planning groups in the three districts assumed that increased judicial time
would be afforded to criminal litigation. See note 123 supra.
140. In 1976, one year before the Act's effective date, the pending criminal caseload dropped
15.6% in Connecticut and increased 3% in Eastern New York. See 1976 Administrative Office
Report, supra note 126, at 11-2. Beginning in 1977, pending caseloads decreased in both districts.
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That drop, however, was not caused by increased terminations. Despite the
shorter time limits, criminal terminations in the two districts generally dedined. 14 The primary reason for their lower pending rates is a decrease in
the number of criminal cases filed, 14 2 due largely to decisions by the United
States Attorney's Offices in both districts to adopt more selective policies of
prosecution. 43 The increased efficiency with which the districts have disposed of their civil matters may thus be traceable in part to the fact that
judges have fewer criminal cases on their calendars and consequently more
time to concentrate on civil litigation.' 44 If these districts abandon their
policies of selective prosecution or acquire additional prosecutors, 4s the
resulting rise in criminal filings may increase their civil congestion.
Experience in New Jersey, however, suggests that selective criminal prosecution may not have a direct impact on civil efficiency. In the two years
following the effective date of the transitional limits, the United States
In 1977, the caseloads decreased by 50.9% in Connecticut and 23.1% in Eastern New York. See
1977 Administrative Office Report, supra note 126, at A-44. In 1978, the pending criminal dockets
decreased 16.5% in Connecticut and 3.4% in Eastern New York. 1978 Administrative Office
Report, supra note 14, at A-46 to -47.
141. In 1977, criminal terminations decreased 2.7% in Connecticut and increased 13.1% in
Eastern New York. See 1977 Administrative Office Report, supra note 126, at A-44. In 1978,
terminations continued to decrease in Connecticut, by 44%, and also declined considerably in
Eastern New York, by 28.6%. See 1978 Administrative Office Report, supra note 14, at A-46.
142. New criminal filings decreased 31% in Connecticut and 14.3% in Eastern New York
during 1977. See 1977 Administrative Office Report, supra note 126, at A-44. During 1978, filings
continued to decrease, by 18% in Connecticut and 11.7% in Eastern New York. See 1978
Administrative Office Report, supra note 14, at A-46.
143. See D. Conn. Final Plan, supra note 88, at 111-3; E.D.N.Y. Final Plan, supra note 97, at
V-4. Although a majority of the assistant United States Attorneys interviewed denied that they
were prosecuting fewer cases as a result of the Act, it is likely that institution of the policy in
Connecticut and Eastern New York at approximately the same time as the effective date of the
Act is somewhat more than coincidental. One author has posited five possible reasons for selective
prosecution: a desire to win; a lack of resources; law enforcement considerations; public opinion;
and lack of collegial organization (e.g., inability of fellow prosecutors to work together effectively). Cox, ProsecutorialDiscretion: An Overview, 13 Am. Crim. L. Rev. 383, 413-17 (1976).
Of these, only the first two seem applicable to the districts studied. Apparently, fewer defendants
are being acquitted after indictment. All districts showed decreases during 1978 from 1977 in the
percentages of defendants in felony and misdemeanor actions who were not convicted. See 1978
Administrative Office Report, supra note 14, at Table D7FMD; 1977 Administrative Office
Report, supra note 126, at Table D7FMD. In addition, pursuant to the Act's provision allowing
the districts to request additional resources necessary to comply with the permanent limits, both
New Jersey and Eastern New York have requested additional assistant United States Attomeys
in their plans. D.N.J. Final Plan, supra note 96, at 51 (8 new assistants); E.D.N.Y. Final Plan,
supra note 97, at V-4 to -5 (some). Connecticut has not requested new prosecutors. D. Conn.
Final Plan, supra note 88, at V-1. The higher conviction rates in 1977 and 1978 and the requests
for additional prosecutors for 1979 are at least indicative of greater prosecutorial discretion under
the Act.
144. The reduced criminal filings in the districts may also be traced to the efforts of prosecutors to dispose of the backlog of pending criminal cases filed prior to the Act. When those
backlogs are eliminated, the additional time to attend to more recent matters may prompt criminal filings to climb.
145. See note 143 supra.

FORDHAM LAW .REVIEW

[Vol. 47

Attorney's Office in that district did not formally limit the number of criminal
cases to be filed.1 46 Nevertheless, despite increases in both civil and criminal
filings in 1977,147 the district managed to terminate more cases in both
dockets than in the previous year. 148 Because criminal filings exceeded
terminations, however, pending criminal matters also rose. 149 Terminations
were slightly lower in 1978; 150 because of a corresponding decrease in filings,
the number of pending criminal cases declined.151 New Jersey's management
of its criminal calendars thus surpassed that of Connecticut and Eastern New
York despite the absence of a formal policy of selective prosecution to cope
with the Act. Therefore, the concern that an increase in the number of
criminal actions filed will adversely affect civil dockets may not be entirely
well-founded.
C. JudicialReaction
Despite New Jersey's apparent success in managing both its civil and criminal dockets under the Act, six of the eight judges interviewed in that district
stated that the Act has disrupted their civil calendars. These judges contended
that in contrast to their experience before the Act, it is now difficult to
schedule civil cases. 152 They also claimed to have fewer trial days for civil
litigation. 153 The remaining two judges stated that the Act has not affected
their civil caseloads. In fact, one judge declared that he may be trying more
civil trials now than before the Act. The second judge's response paralleled
the statistical trend in the district's civil dockets. He stated that during the
first year under the transitional limits, he and the other judges in his vicinage
pushed to dispose of pending criminal matters, an effort which necessarily
spurred an increase in pending civil caseloads. Since
that time, however, they
154
have been actively clearing their civil dockets.

146. See D.N.J. Final Plan, supra note 96, at 33.
147. Civil filings increased over all three years studied. See note 130supra and accompanying
text. Moreover, in 1977, criminal filings rose by a remarkable 71.4%. See 1977 Administrative
Office Report, supra note 126, at A-44.
148. Criminal terminations increased 38.2% in 1977. See 1977 Administrative Office Report,
supra note 126, at A-44. Civil terminations also rose. See note 131 supra and accompanying text.
149. Pending criminal matters increased 10.9% in 1977. See 1977 Administrative Office Report, supra note 126, at A-44.
150. Terminations decreased by 6.0%. See 1978 Administrative Office Report, supra note 14,
at A-46.
151. Filings decreased 25.5% in 1978. See id. The decreases in filings, offset by the slight
decrease in terminations, resulted in a 46.9% decrease in criminal cases pending in 1978. See id.
152. One of those interviewed in this district was a magistrate. He stated that a significant

amount of his workload consisted of preliminary civil matters referred to him pursuant to the
Federal Magistrates Act, 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(A)-(B) (1976). This portion of his workload, lie
said, was caused by a growing propensity of judges to devote a large percentage of time available
for civil litigation to civil trials. The magistrate did express optimism, however, that his civil
calendar would be reduced in the future if the United States Attorney continues to prosecute
criminal matters more selectively.
153. This district, however, has conducted more trials each year under the Act. See Table 1,
note 136 supra.
154. See notes 127-32 supra and accompanying text.
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In contrast to the majority view in New Jersey, the experience of most
judges in Connecticut and Eastern New York mirrored the constant improvement found in their civil dockets. Three out of four judges in Connecticut and four out of six in Eastern New York found that the Act has had
little effect on their calendars. One judge believed that the Act has neither
improved nor hindered his performance. In his words, "I have my own
Speedy Trial Act." A second judge squeezes civil cases into every available
time slot after first scheduling his criminal matters, and thereby manages to
devote equal time to both calendars. As discussed above, another judge had
adopted a new method of civil calendar calls which he said increased
terminations at earlier stages. -5 Three judges in those two districts, however,
expressed concern that they would be unable to handle their civil calendars in
the future if the United States Attorney's Offices abandoned their policies of
15 6
selective prosecution.
Experience thus far in the three districts also mitigates the fear that reassignments of civil and criminal cases among judges will increase under the
Act. Only two out of the eighteen judges interviewed reported that they had
reassigned more cases because of scheduling difficulties created by the short
limits. Although most judges had reassigned cases, the most commonly cited
reason was protracted litigation. For example, one judge was involved in a
year long antitrust case which consumed most of his time. He was therefore
forced to reassign his entire criminal calendar to the other judges in his
district. Another judge, overburdened by an eleven week criminal trial, transferred some civil and criminal cases to senior judges for trial. In neither
instance did pressure to comply with the Act in other cases influence the
decision to reassign.
In sum, none of the three districts has abandoned its civil calendar since
1976. To the contrary, as measured by civil termination rates, judicial
efficiency has steadily improved during the Act's phase-in period. Increased
settlements may partially explain that improvement in New Jersey;, however,
as settlements may reflect more effective case management, they cannot be
viewed necessarily as an adverse consequence of speedier criminal trials. Similarly, although fewer criminal filings in Connecticut and Eastern New York
undoubtedly expanded the time available for civil dockets, experience in New
Jersey suggests that a sudden influx of criminal cases will not necessarily
wreak havoc with civil calendars. Most importantly, the preponderance of
judges declared that the constraints of the time limits have not unduly restricted their attention to civil matters or disrupted their scheduling procedures on either docket.
Of course, when the sanction of dismissal for violation of the permanent
limits becomes effective, the increased pressures of compliance may create
155. See note 138 supra and accompanying text.
156. The three dissenting judges in Connecticut and Eastern New York claimed that the Act
had indeed affected their civil calendars. One judge in Eastern New York claimed that the short
criminal limits had forced him to reduce the time he could devote to civil litigation by 25%.
Another judge who had been forced to put his civil matters on the "back burner" w-as nevertheless optimistic that he will be able to devote increased time to civil litigation in the future as long
as the policy of selective prosecution continues. The third judge summarily expressed his feelings
towards the Act by stating that civil litigants were "getting the short end."
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Nevertheless, from the foregoing analysis, it is ap-

parent that the statutory directive to avoid prejudice to civil litigation has not
yet been subverted. I

8

If these districts are at all representative, the Speedy

Trial Act should not make life miserable for civil litigants in federal courts
after 1979.

IV. ADEQUACY OF DEFENSE UNDER THE ACT
Since the implementation of the Act, defense attorneys have declared that it
undermines a defendant's ability to prepare an effective defense to a criminal
prosecution. 159 Indeed, compliance with the short time limits within which a
case must proceed to trial can place severe burdens on the defense. Especially
in complex cases, in which defendants have approximately two months to
review documents which the prosecution may have taken years to collect and
master, strict application of the limits may be a significant handicap. The
short time periods may also impede a defendant's ability to procure and retain
the attorney of his choice. These problems have prompted numerous calls for
relaxation of the permanent limits. 160 It is submitted, however, that the exist-

157. See 1978 Speedy Trial Report, supra note 10, at 13.
158. Although the rises in the pending rates in the districts may not be the result of the Act,
they must nevertheless be reduced. Several alternate remedies for court congestion should be
considered, however, before amendment of the Act. See notes 332-39 infra and accompanying
text.
159. See notes 181-84 infra and accompanying text. Thirty-four of the 94 districts indicated
that defense attorneys had encountered insufficient time to prepare for trial. 1978 Speedy Trial
Report, supra note 10, at 13-14; see, e.g., D. Conn. Final Plan, supra note 88, at 111-6 to -7;
Report on Problems, supra note 89, at 8; Southern District of New York, Final Plan for Prompt
Disposition of Criminal Cases, 11I-6 to -9 (1978) [hereinafter cited as S.D.N.Y. Final Plan).
Sufficient preparation time under the Act was a concern prior to its enactment. E.g., 1973
Senate Hearings, supra note 111, at 128 (statement of James R. Thompson), 145-50 ("ultimate
destruction of the private Defense Bar" predicted because attorneys would be unable to prepare
or obtain continuances for schedule conflicts) (statement of Gilbert Rosenthal); 120 Cong. Rec.
41790-91 (1974) (rushed preparation would deny due process) (statement of Rep. Dennis). The
fears, however, were either ignored, 1973 Senate Hearings, supra note 111, at 151, or assuaged
by proclamations of the flexibility of the excludable time provisions. 120 Cong. Rec. 41791 (1974)
(statement of Rep. Cohen). Commentators, however, were unconvinced that the Act would not
prejudice defendants' ability to prepare. Black, supra note 1, at 244; Frase, supra note 1, at 669;
Lacey, supra note 1, at 13-15; Platt, supra note 1, at 770-73; Suggestion, supra note 1, at 917.
160. See note 1supra. The planning groups of the District of Connecticut and the Eastern District
of New York have recommended extending the time periods to 60 days for arrest to indictment, 20
days for indictment to arraignment, and 100 days for arraignment to trial. D. Conn. Final Plan,
supra note 88, at VI-1; E.D.N.Y. Final Plan, supra note 97, at VI-1 to -2. The planning group of
the District of New Jersey recommends retention of the 30 day arrest-to-indictment period. It
would, however, change the indictment-to-arraignment period to a maximum of 20 days; ambiguously, the 10 day period would be retained only "when feasible." D.N.J. Final Plan, supra
note 96, at 52-53 (emphasis omitted). Finally, it advocates extension of the arraignment-to-trial
period to 90 days. Id. Several judges and attorneys in the Southern District of New York have
called for a single limit of four to six months from arrest or indictment until trial, or, in the
alternative, lengthening of the arraignment-to-trial period to "120 days or so." Report on Problems, supra note 89, at 9-10. The planning group of the Southern District, however, recommends
extension of the last interval to only 90 days. S.D.N.Y. Final Plan, supra note 159, at VI-I; see
Frase, supra note 1, at 680-84; Platt, supra note 1, at 774; Suggestion, supra note 1, at 933-34.
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ing statutory scheme is sufficient to assure defendants adequate pretrial preparation time, and that amendment of the time limits is therefore unnecessary.
A.

The Burdens Upon Defendants and Their Counsel

The legislative history of the Act indicates that many of the burdens placed
on defendants were not inadvertent. Although the Act was at least partially

intended to clarify the speedy trial rights of defendants, 1 61 its sponsors' major
concern was to protect society from crimes committed by defendants who are
released pending trial. 162 In fact, Congress noted that the public interest in
speedy trials is often in opposition to the interests of defendants, who may favor
1 63
delay because it lessens the chance of conviction or postpones punishment.
Convinced, therefore, that quicker dispositions would result in "better quality
justice,"'1 64 Congress took steps to limit the defendant's ability to manipulate
the pretrial process.
161. In introducing the original Senate bill, Senator Ervin stated that it was intended "to give
effect to the sixth amendment right to speedy trial for persons charged with offenses against the
United States." 116 Cong. Rec. 18844 (1970). Compliance with the Act, however, does not "bar
... any claim of denial of speedy trial as required by amendment VI of the Constitution." 18
U.S.C. § 3173 (1976); see United States v. Herman, 576 F.2d 1139, 1144 n.3 (Sth Cir. 1978);
United States v. MacDonald, 531 F.2d 196, 204 n. 15 (4th Cir. 1976), rev'd on other grounds, 435
U.S. 850 (1978); United States v. Sebastian, 428 F. Supp. 967, 975 (,V.D.N.Y. 1977); Russ &
Mandekern, supra note 1, at 13.
162. 1974 Senate Report, supra note 2, at 15, 32; 1974 House Report, supra note 2, at 80
(minority report), reprinted in [19741 U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News at 74; see notes 62-64 supra
and accompanying text. "[T]he interests of the public in a speedy criminal sanction ... would
have primacy in this legislation. It will help some accused persons, but by and large it will help
the system achieve the goal of speedy application of the criminal law." Speedy Trial: Hearingson
S. 895 Before the Subcomm. on ConstitutionalRights of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 92d
Cong., 1st Sess. 141 (1971) [hereinafter cited as 1971 Senate Hearings] (statement of Prof. Freed);
accord, 1974 House Hearings, supra note 2, at 3 (society's interests in speedy trials have "often
[been] pushed into the background) (statement of Rep. Conyers); Senator Ervin, sponsor of the
Act, stated that "the real purpose behind speedy trial rules is an effort to offset the public's loss of
confidence in the administration of justice." 118 Cong. Rec. 30404 (1972); accord, 1974 House
Hearings, supra note 2, at 157-62 (statement of Sen. Ervin); see 120 Cong. Rec. 24660 (1974)
(statement of Sen. Ervin); United States v. Didier, 542 F.2d 1182, 1188 & n.7 (2d Cir. 1976);
United States v. Beberfeld, 408 F. Supp. 1119, 1126 (S.D.N.Y. 1976).
Senator Ervin also saw the bill as the "constitutional alternative" to preventive detention, a
procedure under which trial judges could deny bail to defendants who were likely to commit
additional crimes before trial. Ervin, supra note 62, at 298; Preventive Detention: Hearings
Before the Subcomm. on ConstitutionalRights of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary,91st Cong.,
2d Sess. 1209 (1970) ("[P]reventive Detention prostitutes the purpose of bail and runs afoul of the
Eighth Amendment.").
163. 1974 House Report, supra note 2, at 14, reprinted in [1974] U.S. Code Cong. & Ad.
News at 7407-08; 120 Cong. Rec. 41618 (1974) (statement of Sen. Ervin); accord, Barker v.
Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 519 (1972) ("[Tihere is a societal interest in providing a speedy trial which
exists separate from, and at times in opposition to, the interests of the accused."); 118 Cong. Rec.
30404 (1972) ("Except in the rarest case, the last thing in the world a guilty defendant wants is a
speedy trial.") (statement of Whitney North Seymour); Symposium, Bail, Preventive Detention
and Speedy Trials, 8 Colum. J.L. & Soc. Prob. 1, 5 (1971) [hereinafter cited as Bail] ('"Tlhe
defense seeks not a prompt trial but an elongated pre-trial hiatus.").
164. Senator Ervin cited evidence from the Southern District of New York where a pilot
program designed to hold trial within 60 days of arrest had resulted in "the increase in convic-
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Under the permanent limits, the Act allows the defendant a theoretical
maximum, excluding continuances, of one hundred days to prepare for
trial. 165 The time actually available, however, is often less than the periods
prescribed by Congress. For example, if a defendant is not arrested prior to
indictment, the initial thirty day period is inapplicable and arraignment must
be held within ten days after the defendant's first appearance before a judicial
officer. 166 The assistant United States Attorneys interviewed in the three districts indicated that generally arrest is not required unless the defendant is
dangerous or likely to flee the jurisidiction. 167 Because only about four out of
ten federal prosecutions commence with arrest, 68 the preponderance 6of9
defendants are limited to a maximum preparation time of seventy days.1

tions, the increase in guilty pleas, the better investigative work . .. in short, the better quality
justice." 118 Cong. Rec. 35295 (1972).
165. See notes 65-68 supra and accompanying text.
166. 18 U.S.C. § 3161(b)-(c) (1976); see Russ & Mandelkern, supra note 1, at 10.
167. Many prosecutors stated that as a result of the Act more arrests are delayed until after
indictment whenever possible. Cf. 120 Cong. Rec. 41623 (1974) ("[T]he Government should not
initiate prosecution until it is ready to move fairly rapidly to trial.") (statement of Sen. Ervin).
168. From July 1, 1976 to June 30, 1978, 28,018 defendants were arrested or summoned prior
to indictment or information. 1978 Speedy Trial Report, supra note 10, at DI. The number of
defendants indicted during that period was approximately 71,825. This figure is conservative; it
does not include indictments that were dismissed prior to arraignment. Id. at E2. The nationwide
percentage of defendants arrested prior to indictment may therefore be estimated at 38%. See
Letter from E. L. Miller to Senator Ervin (Oct. 7, 1970), reprinted in 1971 Senate Hearings,
supra note 162, at 173-74; Black, supra note 1, at 246; Russ & Mandelkern, supra note 1, at 10.
Comparable figures for each of the districts surveyed reveal that only New Jersey approximates
the national average; 44.7% of defendants in that distrnct were arrested before indictment. See
1978 Speedy Trial Report, supra note 10, at D3, E4. That figure drops to 20.6% in Connecticut.
Id. at D2, E3. In Eastern New York, however, 53.1% of defendants required pre-indictment
arrest. That high figure may in part be attributable to the comparatively large percentage of
crimes involving violence prosecuted in Eastern New York. Over 10% of the cases filed there in
1978 involved homicide, robbery, or assault. See 1978 Administrative Office Report, supra note
14, at A-56. The national average for that period was 6.1%. See id. In addition, one judge in
Eastern New York stated that, because of the district's proximity to airports and ports of entry, it
handles a disproportionately large number of smuggling cases, which usually require arrest.
Moreover, the judge indicated that, unlike the practice in some districts, the United States
Attorney's Office retained bank robbery cases for prosecution in federal court, rather than referring them to state authorities.
In many cases, indictment occurs on the same day as arrest. Nationally, the events of
indictment and arrest occurred within 24 hours of each other for 20% of federal defendants In
1978. 1978 Speedy Trial Report, supra note 10, at D1. Percentages for the same period In
Connecticut, New Jersey, and the Eastern District are, respectively, 54.2%, 67.9%, and 11.4%.
Id. at D2-D3. For those defendants in this category whose arrest preceded indictment, the
potential 30 day period is eliminated.
169. Unless the defendant is summoned to appear before the grand jury, or otherwise aware
of the pending charges, he cannot begin preparation until the indictment is filed. One defense
attorney in the Eastern District, however, stated that most of his major corporate clients were not
only aware of the pending indictment but were extensively prepared in anticipation of the
charges. In these instances the prosecution's control over the commencement of the limits does not
prejudice the defendant.
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Moreover, preparation time may be further limited to sixty days or less.
The ten day indictment-to-arraignment period is often eliminated by holding
arraignment on the day of indictment or, when indictment precedes arrest, on
the day of the first appearance.1 7 0 Although this most often occurs when the
defendant has already retained counsel, post-indictment preparation is still
limited to sixty days. Even when the full ten days are available, it is misleading to assume that the entire period can be devoted to preparing a defense.
Effective trial preparation usually cannot begin until the defendant procures
counsel.' 7 1 Unless the defendant was represented prior to indictment, he
must spend part of that time searching for an attorney. Moreover, although
the plans in the three districts surveyed require that the proper steps be taken
at the initial appearance "to assure that the defendant is represented by
counsel,"' 72 they allow the court to enter a not guilty plea for the defendant if
he is not represented at arraignment. In that event the sixty day clock begins
17 3
to run even though no trial preparation has commenced.
In contrast, the shortness of the time limits apparently has had minimal
effect on the ability of the prosecutors in the three districts to prepare for
74
trial. 1 As noted above, the majority of federal cases do not require arrest. l7S
Thus, the time limits in those instances do not begin to run until after indictment. Because the assistant United States Attorney determines when to seek
an indictment from the grand jury, 176 he can forestall the operation of the Act
170. Arraignment was held on the same day that indictment was filed or on the date of first
appearance after indictment in 41% of all federal cases in 1978. 1978 Speedy Trial Report, supra
note 10, at E2. The comparable figures for the three districts are: Connecticut, 18.2%; New
Jersey, 55%; and Eastern New York, 22.2%. Id at E3, E4.
171. Second Circuit Judicial Council Speedy Trial Coordinating Committee, Proposed
Guidelines Under the Speedy Trial Act 4 (Nov. 20, 1978) [hereinafter cited as Second Circuit
Guidelines]; see Ungar v. Sarafite, 376 U.S. 575, 589 (1964); Chandler v. Fretag, 348 U.S. 3, 10
(1954).
172. D. Conn. Final Plan, supra note 88, at II-5; D.N.J. Final Plan, supra note 96, at 6;
E.D.N.Y. Final Plan, supra note 97, at 11-3.
173. D. Conn. Final Plan, supra note 88, at II-4; D.N.J. Final Plan, supra note 96, at 9;
E.D.N.Y. Final Plan, supra note 97, at HI-4.
174. Preparation difficulties for prosecutors have apparently stemmed from sources independent of the Act. "Several plans indicated a communication problem between law enforcement
agencies and the U. S. Attorney's Office. Failure to communicate an arrest delayed presentment
to the grand jury, reduced preparation time, and hence, reduced the likelihood of obtaining a
timely indictment." 1978 Speedy Trial Report, supra note 10, at 14; see notes 195-97 infra and
accompanying text.
175. See notes 167-69 supra and accompanying text.
176. "U. S. attorneys (or their assistants) make the following types of decisions in most federal
criminal cases: whether grand juries should be called, what they will investigate; what evidence
and witnesses are presented to them; whether the federal investigative agency working on a case
will be authorized to make an arrest, investigate further, or drop the matter;, what charges will be
lodged against arrested suspects and (frequently) on how many counts ....
" J. Eisenstein,
Counsel for the United States 13 (1978);-see United States v. Lovasco, 431 U.S. 783, 791-93 (1977)
(prosecutor need not indict even when probable cause established); id. at 799-800 (Stevens, J.,
dissenting) (pre-indictment manipulation by prosecutors); United States v. Marion, 404 U.S. 307,
331 & n.3 (1971) (Douglas, J., concurring); M. Frankel & G. Naftalis, The Grand Jury 21-22,
47-50 (1977); cf. United States v. Watson, 423 U.S. 411, 431 (1976) (Powell, J., concurring)
("[g]ood police practice" to delay arrest until investigation complete).
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until he is well prepared. 17 7 The ability to postpone the commencement of the
time limits is most advantageous in complex white collar cases such as tax
frauds or securities violations.17 8 The prosecutors interviewed indicated that
because suspects in these cases are ordinarily neither violent nor apt to leave
the jurisdiction, arrests are seldom required. Indictment can therefore be
delayed until the case is substantially ready for trial. 179 As a result, minimal

post-indictment preparation is necessary. Indeed, most of the prosecutors felt
that the Act had a beneficial effect; more thorough pre-indictment preparation
ensures that the evidence presented to the grand jury is usually more complete
than prior to the Act.' 8 0 Conversely, however, extensive pre-indictment
preparation by the Government can place defendants who become aware of
177. The prosecutorial delay is limited, of course, by the applicable statute of limitations.
178. Ironically, in cases which require only minimal preparation, such as bank robberies, the
prosecution is unable to delay indictment because arrest is usually necessary. Defendants in those
instances, therefore, may have the entire 30 day period to prepare when it is least necessary.
179. Whitney North Seymour, then United States Attorney for the Southern District of New
York, testified before the Senate that the prosecutors on his staff increasingly delayed indictments
to ensure sufficient preparation time under that district's speedy trial rules. 118 Cong. Rec. 30405
(1972). The practice has continued under the Act in many districts. 1978 Speedy Trial Report,
supra note 10, at 13-14; see Frase, supra note 1, at 697; Lacey, supra note 1, at 15; Russ &
Mandelkern, supra note 1, at 10; Steinberg, Right to Speedy Trial: The ConstitutionalRight and
Its Applicability to the Speedy Trial Act of 1974, 66 J. Crim. L. & Criminology 229, 236-37
(1975); Uviller, Barker v. Wingo: Speedy Trial Gets a FatShyffle, 72 Colum. L. Rev. 1376, 1384
(1972); Bail, supra note 163, at 2.
180. Nine out of 15 prosecutors interviewed indicated that they were now almost fully prepared at indictment. The New Jersey planning group noted that although this practice had
originally forced a reduction in criminal filings, the trend is reversing. D.N.J. Final Plan, supra
note 96, at 34. One prosecutor explained that a bribery case might require a full year of investigation to find two witnesses willing to testify to the grand jury;, after indictment, however, he
would need only hours to prepare for trial. This result parallels the experience of prosecutors
operating under the Second Circuit Rules. The United States Attorney for the Southern District of
New York said that the time limits established by that district pursuant to the Rules had resulted
in the "increased quality of the indictments themselves." 118 Cong. Rec. 30405 (1972) (statement
of Whitney North Seymour). He attributed the rise in quality to increased efficiency of Investigative agencies in compiling and relaying information to the prosecutors and more critical examination of evidence by the assistant United States Attorneys prior to arrest. Id.; see Southern District
Evaluation, supra note 1, at 20. The greater degree of care in drafting indictments was favorably
noted by one judge interviewed in the Eastern District of New York. Accord, 1978 Speedy Trial
Report, supra note 10, at 14; D. Conn. Final Plan, supra note 88, at 111-6 to -7.
The Supreme Court has held that the practice of delaying arrest or indictment does not deprive
a defendant of his rights to a speedy trial and due process of law. United States v. Lovasco, 431
U.S. 783 (1977); United States v. Marion, 404 U.S. 307 (1971). In Marion, the Court held that the
sixth amendment speedy trial right does not attach until there is an accused, which requires either
arrest or indictment. Id. at 313. For a pre-indictment delay to deny a defendant due process of
law, it must cause "substantial prejudice to [defendant's] rights to a fair trial" and be used as "an
intentional device to gain tactical advantage over the accused." Id. at 324; accord, United States
v. Terjeson, 424 F. Supp. 16, 17-18 (E.D.N.Y. 1976). Furthermore, the prejudice to the defendant must be balanced against the prosecution's need to investigate fully. United States v.
Lovasco, 431 U.S. at 796; see United States v. Watson, 423 U.S. 411, 431 (1976) (Powell, J.,
concurring); Hoffa v. United States, 385 U.S. 293, 310 (1966) (no constitutional right to be
arrested as soon as prosecution has probable cause). But see Steinberg, supra note 179, at 237.
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the charges against them only after indictment at a serious strategic disadvantage. 18 1
The vast majority of the defense attorneys interviewed in the District of
New Jersey and the Eastern District of New York declared the limits insufficient to prepare an adequate defense. Only two of the sixteen interviewed
thought the time limits were adequate for all cases; one of the two, however,
handled only simple court-appointed work, and was thus not likely to experience pressure even under the most restrictive limits. Ten out of sixteen had
not been ready to proceed to trial within the periods fixed by the courts, and
attributed this primarily to the tighter scheduling procedures adopted by
judges to avoid violation of the statutory restraints.
A common complaint was that the limits did not allow enough time to
obtain and analyze what often amounted to thousands of pages of documents,
such as financial records or wiretap transcripts, that the prosecution had spent
months collecting and digesting. The problem was aggravated when the prosecution was late in turning over discoverable materials. Others noted the
massive communication difficulties in coordinating a defense among several
defendants and their counsel in large conspiracy cases. One defense attorney
recalled a case in which a hired investigator had to fly to South America,
spend several days dealing with the local bureaucracy to obtain the necessary
documents, and then return before the attorney's firm could begin digesting
the materials. Despite these unusual circumstances, the requested continuance
was denied. Four attorneys who felt the limits too short but had nevertheless
been able to prepare adequately were able to do so only by double and triple
teaming attorneys on difficult cases and increasing the use of private investigators and accountants, at great additional expense to defendants. Moreover, most defense counsel in large metropolitan areas, are either sole practitioners or members of three to five person firms, and are consequently
82
unable to provide these additional services.1'
The defense attorneys interviewed in the District of Connecticut had far
fewer complaints about the Act. Three of six thought the time limits were
always sufficient. Of the three who criticized the limits, only one had experienced inadequate preparation time. The five attorneys who had been able to
prepare adequately indicated that the judges were reasonable in granting
additional time in complex cases, thereby averting undue pressure. Two attorneys, however, were unsure that judicial cooperation would continue once
83
the sanction of dismissal becomes effective.'
181. See United States v. Marion, 404 U.S. 307, 331 (1971) (Douglas, I., concurring); Letter
from E. L. Miller to Senator Ervin (Oct. 7, 1970), reprinted in 1971 Senate Hearings, supra note
162, at 173-74; Steinberg, supra note 179, at 237-39; Suggestion, supra note 1, at 922-23. Several
prosecutors stated that the imbalance in preparation time induced more defendants to plead
guilty.
182. See S.D.N.Y. Final Plan, supra note 159, at 111-8. The attorneys interviewed noted that
many defendants are unable to afford these expenditures. In one case, for example, the extra cost
of using accountants, investigators, and additional attorneys approached $26,000.
183. Judge Platt of the Eastern District of New York has written that when the dismissal
sanction becomes operative, appellate courts may hold more motions for § 3161(h)(8) continuances
not in the "ends of justice," and will thus discharge those cases because trial will not have
commenced within the prescribed limits. Platt, supra note 1, at 769.
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Commentators predicted that the limited preparation time available to defendants would foster several corollary problems. Prominent among their concerns was the expectation that the Act would induce more pro forma not
guilty pleas. 184 They reasoned that the ten day indictment-to-arraignment
period is insufficient to determine the appropriateness of a guilty plea. At
arraignment, therefore, more defendants would automatically plead not
guilty. The later switch to a plea of guilty, by requiring an additional court
appearance, would waste the time of both the court and the assistant United

States Attorney, who is generally present at the entry of the plea. In addition,
the earlier claim of innocence would force the prosecutor to engage in unnecessary trial preparation. Finally, entry of the guilty plea immediately before trial might disrupt the already inflexible schedule of a court hampered by
the time constraints of the Act. 18 5
At least in the three districts surveyed, however, the number of pro forma

not guilty pleas apparently has not increased since the effective date of the
transitional limits. The great majority of defense attorneys and prosecutors
interviewed stated that pro forma not guilty pleas entered shortly after
indictment had been standard defense strategy prior to the Act, and their
frequency had not thereafter increased. In addition, last minute guilty pleas
were common prior to the Act.' 8 6 Several defense attorneys and prosecutors
stated that it is psychologically difficult for defendants to accept what is often
a virtual certainty of conviction; many will therefore not plead guilty until
trial is imminent.' 8 7 Although the short limits of the Act have reduced the
time to postpone that realization, they have not forced more defendants to
plead only on the eve of trial.'88
The permanent limits may induce appellate courts to strike down other practices of more
dubious validity. Under one method, trial is deemed to commence on the date on which voir dire,
i.e., jury selection, begins. D. Conn. Final Plan, supra note 88, at 11-5 to -6; D.N.J. Final Plan,
supra note 96, at 9; E.D.N.Y. Final Plan, supra note 97, at 11-6. Several judges indicated that to
avoid violation of the Act, they often held voir dire on a date within the prescribed limits but then
delayed actual hearing of testimony up to one month thereafter. The Second Circuit Speedy Trial
Coordinating Committee, apparently aware that this procedure subverts the legislative intent,
called upon courts in its Guidelines to minimize all delays after voir dire begins: "Jury selection
shall proceed forthwith and shall be completed as promptly as possible. The opening statements
and the taking of testimony shall commence promptly thereafter." Second Circuit Guidelines,
supra note 171, at 7. When a court selects "several petit juries at the beginning of a month, ...
the trial shall not be deemed to commence until the opening statements have been made or the
taking of testimony has commenced." Id.
184. Frase, supra note 1, at 679; Suggestion, supra note 1, at 917. Eight planning groups
reported that pro forma not guilty pleas were being entered, but did not indicate whether fewer
such pleas had been entered prior to the Act. 1978 Speedy Trial Report, supra note 10, at 14.
185. When the time slot allocated for a trial becomes vacant, another matter must be rescheduled to fill the gap in order to avoid a waste of court time. See Report on Problems, supra
note 89, at 9.
186. Evidence was presented to the House Subcommittee on Crime to the effect that defendants who would ultimately plead guilty usually did not do so until 30 to 45 days after arraignment. The House Committee on the Judiciary believed that the Act would not substantially affect
that practice. 1974 House Report, supra note 2, at 30, reprintedin [1974] U.S. Code Cong. & Ad.
News at 7423.
187. Accord, Bail, supra note 163, at 5, 26.
188. One assistant United States Attorney stated that preparation that results in a guilty plea
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Opponents of the Act also predicted that it would substantially hinder
defendants' efforts to procure and retain counsel. 18 9 Interviews with defense
attorneys confirm these forecasts. Several attorneys found that the short time
periods prior to arraignment curtail the time that defendants have to obtain
counsel and limit their ability to arrange financing. 190 Because most criminal
defense attorneys require payment before they agree to represent a client,19 t
defendants who cannot marshall sufficient funds may thus be forced to select
attorneys who are not the counsel of their choice.' 92 Moreover, many defense
attorneys declared that the pressure to hold trials within the period allowed by
the Act has led judges to deny continuances to accommodate good faith
conflicts in attorneys' schedules.' 93 This inflexible attitude often forces attorneys to reassign cases, which in turn causes duplication of efforts. 94 As a

is never wasted. The purpose of preparation is to convict the defendant; a conviction obtained
without need for a trial saves time. Prosecutors in the Southern District of New York reason that
more pleas occur on the eve of trial simply because trial is closer to arraignment. Interview with
Prof. Michael Martin, Speedy Trial Reporter, Southern District of New York, in New York City
(Feb. 28, 1979); see Report on Problems, supra note 159, at 9.
189. 1973 Senate Hearings, supra note 111, at 128-29; 1971 Senate Hearings, supra note 162,
at 174; 120 Cong. Rec. 41791 (1974) (statement of Rep. Dennis); Lacey, supra note 1, at 13; Platt,
supra note 1, at 770; Russ & Mandelkern, supra note 1, at 30; Bail, supra note 163, at 4;
Suggestion, supra note 1, at 924.
190. Five of six defense attorneys in the District of New Jersey and six of ten in the Eastern
District indicated that many defendants were denied their services because of inability to raise the
necessary retainer fee. None of the six attorneys in the District of Connecticut had turned down
clients for that reason. The Connecticut Final Plan, however, indicates that judges used excludable time to ensure that defense counsel was present at arraignment in that district. D. Conn. Final
Plan, supra note 88, at 111-9. That additional time may have permitted more defendants to obtain
sufficient funds to obtain counsel.
191. Many criminal defense attorneys require that clients pay a substantial percentage of their
fee before accepting cases because fees are much harder to collect after trial, especially if the
defendant is convicted. Moreover, federal judges are reluctant to relieve defense counsel from
their obligations to clients on the ground of nonpayment of the fees. See Second Circuit
Guidelines, supra note 171, at 4 (filing of notice of appearance binds counsel). But see ABA Code
of Professional Responsibility, DR 2-110(C)(f) (1976) (nonpayment of fee grounds for withdrawal).
Critics of the Act had predicted that the short time limits would not provide the defendant with
enough time to raise the necessary money. See 1973 Senate Hearings, supra note 111, at 14546,
148.
192. Russ & Mandelkem, supra note 1, at 30, Suggestion, supra note I, at 924.
193. Ten of the 23 defense attorneys interviewed had been denied continuances for schedule
conflicts. The plans of the three districts state that continuances for attorney schedule conflicts are
not available as a matter of right. D. Conn. Final Plan, supra note 88, at 11-7; D.N.J. Final Plan,
supra note 96, at 9; E.D.N.Y. Final Plan, supra note 97, at 11-7. The District of Connecticut Plan
further provides that "under existing interpretations," an attorney schedule conflict is not grounds
for a § 3161(h)(8) continuance. According to one New York City Bar Association Committee,
federal judges believe that defense attorneys are fungible; they view forced substitution of
counsel, therefore, as an acceptable means to avoid violation of the Act. Criminal Courts and
Procedure Comm. of the Association of the Bar of the City of New York, Comments on the
Guidelines Under the Speedy Trial Act 6 (Dec. 8, 1978). Several planning groups reported that
the difficulty in obtaining continuances had made the representation of defendants in federal
criminal cases less desirable. 1978 Speedy Trial Report, supra note 10, at 14.
194. See, e.g., D. Conn. Final Plan, supra note 88, at 111-6 to -7.
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result, several defense attorneys have been compelled to reduce their federal
criminal caseloads. 195
Prosecutors, on the other hand, found that the Act had not created serious
scheduling conflicts for their offices.' 9 6 According to the assistant United
States Attorneys interviewed, though reassignment is occasionally necessary
when a previous trial in which the prosecutor is engaged is delayed or
lasts longer than expected, the instances in which reassignment is required
have not increased since the effective date of the transitional limits. The
minimal effect of the Act on prosecutors' schedules presumably stems, at least
in part, from the degree of control that they exercise over the initial stages of
197
the majority of proceedings.
Given these minimal scheduling conflicts, the prosecutors interviewed had
few difficulties in complying with the Act. '98 The defense attorneys, however,
almost invariably called for the relaxation of the permanent limits. In fact, the
problems of insufficient preparation time, procuring counsel, and attorney
scheduling conflicts are cited in the final plans of two of the three districts
surveyed as reasons for their recommendations of amendment. 9 9 All three
plans called for the extension of the arraignment-to-trial period; 20 0 two advocated the liberalization of the other two intervals as well. 201
B.

The Statutory Solution

Despite the constraints placed upon defendants by the Act, proposals to
lengthen the time limits overlook its intrinsic remedial measures. More liberal
use of the excludable time provisions, especially section 3161(h)(8), can effectively alleviate the difficulties encountered by defendants and their counsel
under the permanent limits.
195. Accord, 1978 Speedy Trial Report, supra note 10, at 14. Reassignment appeared most
necessary in the District of New Jersey and the Eastern District of New York. Several attorneys
recalled that judges often responded to requests for continuances by advising the defendant to
find himself another lawyer.
196. Their experiences contradict the expectations of at least one commentator. Suggestion,
supra note 1, at 916 & n.55. Other commentators have reasoned that the Act contains enough
loopholes to permit prosecutors to circumvent its effect. Russ & Mandelkern, supra note 1, at 1.
Thus, prosecutors might dismiss indictments to toll the time limits pursuant to § 3161(h)(6) and
then reindict for a similar offense, delay arrest or indictment, or obtain a sealed indictment,
thereby tolling the limits until it is unsealed pursuant to § 3161(c). Id. at 9-11; see Frase, supra
note 1, at 685. Judicial interpretations of the Act have also helped the prosecutor. The Second
Circuit has held that the 30 day arrest-to-indictment limit begins to run from the date of federal
arrest, not state arrest, thus aiding the federal prosecutor's control over the commencement of
the limits. United States v. Mejias, 552 F.2d 435, 441 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 847 (1977).
Another court has held the arrest-to-indictment limit applicable only when the defendant Is
arrested on a complaint. United States v. Dixon, 446 F. Supp. 58, 62 (D.D.C. 1978).
197. See notes 175-77 supra and accompanying text.
198. Accord, D. Conn. Final Plan, supra note 88, at I1-5 to -6. But see D.N.J. Final Plan,
supra note 96, at 32.
199. D. Conn. Final Plan, supra note 88, at VI-3 to -4; D.N.J. Final Plan, supra note 96, at
53-54.
200. D. Conn. Final Plan, supra note 88, at VI-1; D.N.J. Final Plan, supra note 96, at 53;
E.D.N.Y. Final Plan, supra note 97, at VI-2.
201. D. Conn. Final Plan, supra note 88, at VI-I; E.D.N.Y. Final Plan, supra note 97, at
VI-1 to -2.
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The Act does not list insufficient preparation time as a specific ground for
excludable delay. Section 3161(h)(8), however, provides that the trial judge
may, in his discretion, grant a continuance if he determines that "the ends of
justice served by the granting of such continuance outweigh the best interests
of the public and the defendant in a speedy trial. ' 20 2 The section states that
general court congestion, failure of the government to obtain an available
witness, or lack of diligent preparation by the United States Attorney, cannot
justify a delay. 20 3 In all other instances, however, a section 3161(h)(8) continuance may be granted upon consideration of the following factors: whether
without the delay continuation would be impossible or result in a miscarriage
of justice; whether complex issues before the grand jury or events beyond the
control of the Government would delay indictment; and whether the case is so
complex that it would be unreasonable to expect adequate preparation within
4
the specified limits.

20

The legislative history indicates that section 3161(h)(8) was at least partly
intended to protect the rights of defendants. 20 5 The Senate Report declared
the section central to the legislation because "[i]t
allows for the necessary
flexibility to make [the Act] a realistic goal. ...
.,206 Accordingly, in response to
fears that defendants would be unable to prepare for complex cases or to retain the
counsel of their choice, the bill's sponsors declared that a section 316 1(h)(8)
continuance should be available in those instances. 20 7 Congress was thus
cognizant that the public's right to speedy
justice should not prejudice the
20 8
defendant's interest in reasonable delays.
In spite of the flexible application of section 3161(h)(8) intended by Congress, approximately half of the judges interviewed in the three districts construed the provision narrowly. 20 9 The explanations for this reticence to grant
excludable continuances ranged from hostility toward the Act to unfamiliarity
with its provisions. One judge, whose antipathy was obvious, reasoned that
"the best way to get rid of a bad law is to enforce it strictly." Several judges
noted that granting continuances increased their administrative burden because they only "rented time"; postponed trials must be squeezed into time
slots that may already be overcrowded. 21 0 Others, perhaps unaware of the
202.

18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(8)(A) (1976).

203. Id. § 3161(h)(8)(C).
204. Id. § 3161(h)(8)(B).
205. 1974 Senate Report, supra note 2, at 21; 1974 House Report, supra note 2, at 21,
reprinted in [1974] U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News at 7414; 1974 House Hearings,supra note 2, at
338 (statement of Rep. Barrs); 1971 Senate Hearings, supra note 162, at 86 (statement of Chief
Judge Stephens).
206. 1974 Senate Report, supra note 2, at 39.
207. Id. at 21.
208. "The Committee believes that both delay and haste in the processing of criminal cases
must be avoided; neither of these tactics inures to the benefit of the defendant, the Government,
the courts nor society. The word speedy does not, in the Committee's view, denote assembly-fine
justice, but efficiency in the processing of cases which is commensurate with due process." 1974
House Report, supra note 2, at 15, reprinted in [1974] U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News at 7408.
209. Eight of 14 judges adopted a narrow construction.
210. Accord, United States v. Wendy, 575 F.2d 1025, 1031 (2d. Cir. 1978); United States v.
Rothman, 567 F.2d 744, 748 (8th Cir. 1977); Acha v. Beame, 438 F. Supp. 70, 80 (S.D.N.Y.
1977), af0'd, 570 F.2d 57 (2d Cir. 1978); United States v. Declet, 432 F. Supp. 622, 624
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flexibility intended by the drafters, feared criticism that they would subvert
mandate of speed if they did not try every case within sixty
the congressional
211
days.
An inflexible judicial policy toward continuances is inconsistent with the
congressional directive of section 3161(h)(8). 2 12 Regardless of the complexity
of the case, continuances should be granted in order to give both the defendant and the prosecutor sufficient time to prepare. In cases involving extensive documents, detailed financial records, lengthy wiretap transcripts, or
several defendants, compliance with the sixty day arraignment-to-trial limit
may be unduly burdensome on one or both parties. Especially when lengthy
trial, denial of a
discoverable materials are not received until shortly '2before
13
continuance would cause a "miscarriage of justice.
To determine the appropriateness of a continuance for additional preparation time, courts must balance the public's and the defendant's right to a
speedy trial against the possible prejudice to the defendant or the Government
if the continuance is denied. 21 4 The Second Circuit's Speedy Trial Guidelines
Committee, which advocates a liberal policy toward excludable time, suggests
that several factors should be included in the balancing test: the diligence with
which the defendant and his counsel used the time available; the time needed
for discovery, and the amount and complexity of the evidence. 2 Is In addition
to these factors, courts should consider the relative equality of preparation
(S.D.N.Y. 1977); D. Conn. Final Plan, supra note 88, at 111-5; Report on Problems, supra note 89,
at 3.
211. Accord, D. Conn. Final Plan, supra note 88, at 111-5; Platt, supra note 1, at 769;
Southern District Evaluation, supra note 1, at 521. "The 60-Day Rule is flat. That's all there Is to
it.... It will get you nowhere to argue against the 60-Day Rule. I didn't make it. I'm stuck with
it and so are you and all of us .... [Yiou are here before a Judge who is directed by the Circuit
Court, 60 Days." In re Ford, No. 78-3011, slip op. at 2 (2d Cir. Mar. 30, 1978) (quoting the trial
judge).
212. See In re Ford, No. 78-3011, slip op. at 5 (2d Cir. Mar. 30, 1978) ("Expedition, even
under the Speedy Trial Act, is a means to justice, not the end."); United States v. Uptaln, 531
F.2d 1281, 1291 (5th Cir. 1976) ("[A] scheduled trial date should never become such an overarching
end that it results in the erosion of the defendant's right to a fair trial.'); Second Circuit Guidelines, supra note 171, at 33-38; notes 206-08 supra and accompanying text; cf. Gavino v. MacMahon, 499 F.2d 1191, 1196 (2d Cir. 1974) (Second Circuit Rules not meant "to permit a district
court to ride roughshod over the right of a defendant to prepare for trial"); Stans v. Gagliardi, 485
F.2d 1290, 1291 (2d Cir. 1973) (public interest in speedy trials under Second Circuit rules "must
be carefully weighed against a defendant's claim of neel for a short delay to permit proper
preparation').
213. Second Circuit Guidelines, supra note 171, at 35; cf. Gavino v. MacMahon, 499 F.2d
1191, 1196 (2d Cir. 1974) (belated reception of extensive discovery material); Stans v. Gagliardi,
485 F.2d 1290, 1291 (2d Cir. 1973) (complicated discovery completed 13 days before trial and
amended bill of particulars received on eve of trial).
214. See 18 U.S.C. § 3161(hX8XA) (1976).
215. Second Circuit Guidelines, supra note 171, at 35, 37; accord, United States v. Waldman,
579 F.2d 649, 653 (Ist Cir. 1978); United States v. Rothman, 567 F.2d 744, 747 (7th Cir. 1977);
United States v. Little, 567 F.2d 346, 348 (8th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 969 (1978);
United States v. Uptain, 531 F.2d 1281, 1286 (5th Cir. 1976). The Guidelines also advise that
emergencies such as acts of God, strikes, and sudden illness of the defense attorney, prosecutor,
or judge should generally be grounds for excludable time. Second Circuit Guidelines, supra note
171, at 31-32.
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time available to each side; extensive pre-indictment investigation by the
prosecution may justify a limited delay to allow defense counsel to become
more familiar with that evidence. For example, in a bank robbery where the
sole defendant involved is arrested immediately, the evidence is usually simple and discovery should be readily available; because both the prosecution
and the defendant became aware of the charge at the same time, preparation
time is equal. In this instance no continuance should be required.
Consider, however, a narcotics conspiracy case with seven defendants,
under investigation by the government for a year, entailing extensive discovery, voluminous wiretap transcripts, and witnesses scattered throughout
Mexico. 2 16 In such a case defendant's counsel must travel to a foreign
country, arrange for an interpreter, interrogate witnesses, review the
transcripts, prepare a suppression motion, and coordinate his client's defense
with six other defendants and their counsel. Moreover, the additional twelve
months of preparation may have given the prosecutor a substantial edge over
his opponent. The denial of defense counsel's motion for a continuance could
deprive his client of an effective defense even though he had prepared
diligently. Unless a compelling public interest could be shown in opposition,
"the ends of justice" would merit at least a short continuance.
To alleviate the difficulties of obtaining counsel, excludable time should
also be used to ensure that the arraignment-to-trial interval does not commence until the defendant is in a position to begin preparation. 21 7 If a reasonable delay of arraignment would provide the time necessary for the defendant
to retain counsel, an "ends of justice" continuance should be granted.2 8 To
determine reasonableness, courts should consider the length of the requested
delay, 219 the diligence of the defendant's search for counsel, 220 the complexity
222
of the case, 221 and a realistic appraisal of the defendant's financial position.
Thus, an indigent defendant charged with burglarizing a mailbox would be in
216. This hypothetical is taken from the facts of Gavino v. Mfaafahon, 499 F.2d 1191 (2d
Cir. 1974).
217. Second Circuit Guidelines, supra note 171, at 4.
218. The statute is unclear whether the dismissal sanctions and the excludable time provisions apply to the indictment-to-arraignment interval. See Frase, supra note 1, at 688. The
Second Circuit Guidelines suggest that neither the sanctions nor the excludable time provisions
apply to that interval. Second Circuit Guidelines, supra note 171, at 4-S. Allowing indefinite
delays of arraignment, however, may ultimately delay trial, and would thus undermine the
congressional intent that trials be promptly held. See 1974 House Report, supra note 2, at 31,
reprinted in [1974] U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News at 7424.
219. Second Circuit Judicial Council Speedy Trial Coordinating Committee, Revised Guidelines Under the Speedy Trial Act 7 (Jan. 8, 1979) [hereinafter cited as Revised Second Circuit
Guidelines].
220. See United States v. Lustig, 555 F.2d 737, 744 (9th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S.
1045 (1978); United States ex rel. Carey v. Rundle, 409 F.2d 1210, 1213 (3d Cir. 1969), cert.
denied, 397 U.S. 946 (1970); Glenn v. United States, 303 F.2d 536, 543 (5th Cir. 1962).
221. See United States v. Fears, 450 F. Supp. 249, 251 (E.D. Tenn. 1978).
222. Ideally, the quality of a defendant's representation should not reflect his wealth. See
United States ex rel. Carey v. Rundie, 409 F.2d 1210, 1213 (3d Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S.
946 (1970). Accordingly, the Second Circuit Guidelines state that "[s]hould a nonindigent defendant appear without counsel, the court should take steps to insure that the defendant retains
counsel promptly . . ." Second Circuit Guidelines, supra note 171, at 4.
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a poor position to request an extended delay. The preparation required for the
case presumably is minimal and uncomplicated, and there is accordingly less
need for a counsel with special expertise. The likelihood that the defendant
would benefit from the delay is slight; even with an extended continuance his
ability to raise the money to retain a particular attorney is doubtful. On the
other hand, a defendant with considerable assets charged with violation of the
Internal Revenue Code would have a more compelling reason for a continuance. The necessity of obtaining a particular counsel is greater because of
the complexity of the charges. Moreover, the delay is more likely to be
worthwhile because the defendant would have time to liquidate assets in
order to raise the money necessary to retain counsel.
An "ends of justice" continuance should also be available to resolve reasonable attorney scheduling conflicts. Both the defendant and the Government
have strong interests in retaining their original counsel throughout the proceedings. 223 If the retained attorney is particularly skilled in the complex
issues of the case, or preparation is well advanced, forced substitution of
counsel could severely prejudice the defendant. Similarly, however, protracted delay would be contrary to the public's and the defendant's rights to a
speedy trial.
As the Second Circuit Guidelines recommend, conflicts can often be averted
by scheduling the trial date as soon as possible. 224 Even when a date is set
well in advance of trial, however, conflicts may subsequently arise. 225 In
those cases the Guidelines advise that the defendant's interest in delay should
be determined by examining "the degree of complexity of the case," 226 "the
date of counsel's first involvement with the case,"' 227 "the good faith of counsel
in trying to avoid conflicting dates."' 228 "the length of time for which the
223. If a prosecutor or defense counsel must reassign a case because of a scheduling conflict,
the new attorney must spend considerable time familiarizing himself with the case before preparation can continue. See Gandy v. Alabama, 569 F.2d 1318, 1320 (5th Cir. 1978); Rastelli v. Platt,
534 F.2d 1011, 1012 (2d Cir. 1976) (per curiam); 1978 Speedy Trial Report, supra note 10, at 14.
Forced substitution of defense counsel may also raise constitutional issues. See notes 318-21 ittfra
and accompanying text.
224. Second Circuit Guidelines, supra note 171, at 33. One judge in Eastern New York
declared that any scheduling conflict that develops in his court is the fault of the attorney. He sets
all trial dates for 60 days after arraignment, and requires that no attorney accept a case at
arraignment who has any commitments two months later.
225. Id.; see Report on Problems, supra note 89, at 1-2.
226. Second Circuit Guidelines, supra note 171, at 36.
227. Id. The longer an attorney has been involved in a case, the more effort would be wasted
if the defendant were forced to find a new attorney. See note 223 supra.
228. Second Circuit Guidelines, supra note 171, at 36. The denial of a continuance because
counsel failed to inform the court of his future commitments was upheld in In re Sutter, 543 F.2d
1030 (2d Cir. 1976). Denials of continuances because of the bad faith of the defendant have also
been upheld. See United States v. Lustig, 555 F.2d 737, 744 (9th Cir. 1977) (defendant ignored
warning given by judge 33 days before trial to settle conflict with attorney or find another), cert.
denied, 434 U.S. 1045 (1978); United States v. Declet, 432 F. Supp. 622, 623 (S.D.N.Y. 1977)
(defendant demanded trial minutes before commencement of proceeding to change plea to guilty);
United States v. De Freitas, 410 F. Supp. 241, 242-43 (D.N.J. 1976) (defendant failed to
cooperate with assigned counsel), aff'd, 556 F.2d 569(3d Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 847 (1977). See
also Ungar v. Sarafite, 376 U.S. 575, 591 (1964).
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continuance is sought," and "the availability of substitute counsel acceptable to
Perhaps the most troublesome example of "unavoidable" defense attorney scheduling conflicts
is state court commitments. Many state courts, because of large numbers of cases that are in
comparable states of readiness, are unable to schedule trials for a date certain as in federal court.
Telephone Interview with Leon Polsky, Chief of Criminal Defense Division of the Legal Aid
Society of New York (Mar. 14, 1978). As a result, it is very difficult for an attorney representing
a client at arraignment in federal court to be sure that his representation in state court will not
eventually conflict with the trial date set by the federal judge. Apparently many federal judges,
because they set dates so far in advance, are intolerant of these later-acquired conflicts, and deny
continuances that would enable the attorney to retain both his federal and state cases. See
Criminal Courts and Procedure Comm. of the Association of the Bar of the City of New York,
Comments on the Guidelines Under the Speedy Trial Act 1-5 (Dec. 8, 1978). One state court
judge, reflecting the practice of his colleagues, stated that in this situation, "I let the lawyer go to
federal court because I know he is going to have his head in a sling if I don't." Id. at 3.
Agreements between federal and state courts have been arranged to help reduce these conflicts.
For example, the Eastern District of New York has an agreement with the Appellate Division of
the Second Department in New York under which the federal court issues a Certificate of
Engagement to the defense attorney at least 21 days before the scheduled trial date. State court
judges in Kings County usually recognize these certificates, thereby avoiding conflicts. Letter
from Hon. Jacob Mishler, Chief Judge, Eastern District of New York (Feb. 27, 1979) (on file with
the Fordham Law Review). State court judges have complained, however, that most federal court
judges, evidently hesitant to exceed the bounds of the speedy trial rules, do not reciprocate and
honor prior state court commitments. See Lacey, supra note 1, at 7. That reticence has prompted
the New York City Bar Association Committee on Criminal Courts and Procedure to request that
the Second Circuit include within its Guidelines engagements of counsel in other courts as specific
grounds for a continuance, using the factors adopted by the Circuit for resolving scheduling
conflicts in general. See notes 224-27 supra, 229-30 infra and accompanying text.
In view of the flexibility intended by the framers of the Act, the Committee's recommendation
is meritorious. Although other court commitments should not constitute automatic grounds for
excludable time, the interests of justice may often warrant reasonable continuances to enable
attorneys to honor those commitments. In addition to the factors described at notes 224-27 supra,
229-31 infra and accompanying text for resolving schedule conflicts in general, courts should in
these instances examine the diligence of the attorney in informing the court of the commitment,
the proximity of the request to the scheduled federal court trial date, and the prejudicial effect of
denial of the continuance on the participants in the state proceeding. As an example, consider an
attorney scheduled for trial in state court the week of June 1st; he believes the proceeding will
take one week to complete. In the interim, he agrees to represent a defendant charged with
securities fraud in federal court. At the April 10th arraignment, he informs the federal judge of
the commitment, and trial is accordingly scheduled for June 8th (59 days after arraignment).
Unforeseen complications that arise in the middle of the state trial, however, make it certain that
the proceeding will not terminate until June 12th. If the attorney immediately contacts the federal
court judge, a short continuance should be granted. Because the conflict did not arise until the
state proceeding was underway, it would be unreasonable to demand that the state court yield; at
the same time it would also be prejudicial to require that the federal defendant seek new counsel
for a complicated defense only days before trial. If, however, the conflict resulted because the
commencement of the state trial were postponed to the week of June 12th and the state court is
likely to defer the proceeding even further, the grounds for the federal court to grant a
continuance would be less tenable.
If, despite the attorney's lack of diligence in bringing the commitment to the federal court's
attention, the defendant would be severely prejudiced by denial of a continuance, the court
should consider granting the continuance but penalizing the attorney pursuant to the sanctions
provided by the Act in 18 U.S.C. § 3162(b) (1976). See In re Suter, 543 F.2d at 1035-36; 1974
House Report, supra note 2, at 34, reprinted in [1974] U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News at 7426.
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the parties. ' 229 In weighing the public's interest, courts should consider the
length of the requested delay 230 and its effect on the overall operation of the
court. Moreover, in view of the legislative intent to reduce pretrial recidivism,
courts should also examine the propensity of the defendant to commit other
crimes before trial. 23 1 For example, assume that a single practitioner in a busy
metropolitan area appears at arraignment as counsel for a defendant charged
with attempting to smuggle a small amount of heroin. Ten days later counsel
requests that the trial be postponed for ninety days because he had previously
accepted cases that are set for trial in the same period as the date set by the
court. The continuance should be denied. The facts and issues in the case are
presumably simple. The good faith of counsel is suspect for having accepted
the case without informing the court of his prior commitments. In addition,
the defendant, if released, may be likely to continue his smuggling activities if
not tried soon. Finally, in such a large metropolitan area substitute counsel
should be readily available and able to prepare this simple case within the
time remaining.
Contrast, however, a prosecution for conspiracy, involving lengthy wiretap
transcripts and a defense of mistaken identity. Preparation has been diligent
and is nearly complete. Unexpectedly, however, the court is forced to postpone the original trial date three weeks to a date on which counsel will be
trying a murder trial in state court. The requested continuance should be
granted; the conflict is not the fault of the defense and the requested delay is
brief. Furthermore, reassignment to an attorney who is unfamiliar with the
complicated issues of the case may severely prejudice the defendant's ability
to marshall an effective defense, especially if the conflict arose immediately
232
prior to trial.
229. Second Circuit Guidelines, supra note 171, at 39; see United States v. Lustig, 555 F.2d
737, 744 (9th Cir. 1977) (defendant wealthy enough to find substitute counsel), cert. denied, 434
U.S. 1045 (1978); United States v. Brown, 495 F.2d 593, 600 (1st Cir.) (defendant seeking second
continuance to procure counsel for third time), cert. denied. 419 U.S. 965 (1974); United States v.
Sexton, 473 F.2d 512, 514 (5th Cir. 1973) (may not use "right to counsel" as a delaying tactic).
230. As an illustration of appropriate lengths for delay, the Second Circuit Guidelines Committee initially posited a situation in which a trial judge must reschedule the trial date to a day
which conflicts with the schedule of the defense attorney. The Guidelines suggest that if further postponement for one week would reconcile the conflict, a continuance should be granted.
If, however, the attorney were to need a month-long continuance, substitute counsel should be
required. Second Circuit Guidelines, supra note 171, at 34 This suggestion, however, prompted
strong criticism from the New York City Bar Association's Committee on Criminal Courts, Law
and Procedure, which noted that "[w]hether the first case is simple or complex, we know of no
earthly reason why the defendant should be deprived of the attorney he selected or the government should be forced to pull an attorney off some other matter to start from scratch on a case
prepared by someone else. Barring extraordinary situations, the only interest served by the
forced substitution is that of statisticians interested only in how fast the work is turned out."
Criminal Courts and Procedure Comm. of the Association of the Bar of the City of New York,
Comments on the Guidelines Under the Speedy Trial Act 7 (Dec. 8, 1978). The example was thus
deleted from the Revised Guidelines, and replaced with a brief caveat that continuances "must be
of reasonable duration or the statutory purpose will be subverted." Revised Second Circuit
Guidelines, supra note 219, at 37.
231. See note 162 supra and accompanying text.
232. See Second Circuit Guidelines, supra note 171, at 36.
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When the competing interests appear equally strong, such as when the
requested delay is lengthy but the prejudice caused by denial of the continuance would be serious, a careful examination of the nature of the offense
is necessary. 233 For example, assume that delays of equal length are requested
in an international drug conspiracy case and in a securities fraud case against
a broker. If the continuances are denied, the effect of forced substitution of
counsel will be equally severe on both defendants. If the narcotics conspirators are released pending trial, a speedy conviction may be necessary to
halt their continued sales of drugs. The strong public interest in bringing the
conspirators to trial quickly might, therefore, warrant denial of their request
in spite of the possible prejudice. Merely indicting the broker, however, may
effectively deter him from additional violations; the opprobrium of the
criminal charges should severely curtail his ability to conduct further securities transactions. The less compelling public interest in his swift conviction,
therefore, should justify a continuance to avoid similar prejudice.
In sum, liberal, but nonabusive, use of section 3161(h)(8) can accommodate
the legitimate needs of defendants without subverting the congressional intent. Congress has declared that cases be tried within sixty days of arraignment in order to protect the public's right to speedy trials. At the same time it
provided for excludable periods of delay in order to safeguard a defendant's
ability to prepare and retain counsel. When denial of a continuance would
prejudice that ability, and the need for delay outweighs the public interest in
prompt adjudications, the continuance should be granted. Properly employed,
therefore, the "ends of justice" provision should make relaxation of the time
limits unnecessary.
V.

WAIVER

To alleviate the often burdensome time pressures imposed by the Act,
several courts have allowed defendants to waive 234 the time limits. 2 35 Indeed,
some judges deem the device necessary to preserve the constitutionality of the
Act. 236 In contrast to the excludable time provisions, which provide only
temporary relief from the applicable limits, 237 waiver terminates the operation
233. The Supreme Court has indicated that the public interest in speedy trials varies according to the relative danger of defendants to society. Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 531 (1971).
Two judges interviewed felt that for this reason the Act should apply only to crimes which
threaten the security of society, such as kidnapping or narcotics transactions. Accord, 1978
Speedy Trial Report, supra note 10, at A2, A4. The legislative history, however, indicates that a
similar proposal was rejected. The original version of the Act did not apply to certain categories
of cases such as securities, tax, and antitrust. S. 3936, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. § 3163 (1970), 116
Cong. Rec. 18846-48. This "blanket exemption" was subsequently deleted in favor of a case-bycase approach using the excludable time provisions of § 3161(h)(8). 119 Cong. Rec. 3267 (1973)
(memorandum by Sen. Ervin).
234. Waiver is traditionally defined as "an intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a
known right or privilege." Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. 387, 404 (1977) (quoting Johnson v.
Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464 (1938)).
235. See United States v. Poulack, 556 F.2d 83, 84, 85 & n.l (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S.
986 (1977); United States v. Didier, 542 F.2d 1182, 1184 (2d Cir. 1976); Wall St. J., Sept. 1, 1977,
at 28, col. 2; notes 256, 258, 261 infra and accompanying text.
236. See notes 257, 300-01 infra and accompanying text.
237. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 3161(h), 3162(a)(2) (1976).
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of the time strictures. 238 Thereafter, the defendant may invoke only his sixth
240
amendment speedy trial guarantee 239 for subsequent unjustified delay.
24
All participants in a criminal case benefit from a waiver. ' A permanent
lift of the speedy trial limits allows a judge to schedule the case at his convenience, free from the threat of dismissal for excessive delay. Moreover, the
ability to waive the Act may serve the interests of both prosecutors and
defendants to whom delay is often just as desirable. As such, however, waiver
is a potentially dangerous expedient, capable of subverting the public's interest in prompt dispositions. In addition, it is also unnecessary as a means
to
242
protect defendants against unduly harsh operation of the time limits.
A.

The Use of Waiver

The Act grants no explicit right to waive its provisions. 243 It does, however, permit a "constructive" waiver of a defendant's right to dismissal. Section 3162(a)(2) states that a defendant's failure to move to dismiss for violation
of the time limits prior to trial 244 or entry of a plea of guilty 245 or nolo

238. If a mistrial is subsequently declared, the defendant's right to a speedy trial will be
revived and a new waiver would have to be obtained from the defendant. United States v.
Didier, 542 F.2d 1182, 1187 (2d Cir. 1976). The question of waiver also arises with respect to
minimum time limits. The Connecticut and New Jersey Final Plans recommend the establishment of a 30 day minimum time limit before which the defendant cannot be tried. D. Conn. Final
Plan, supra note 88, at VI-4; D.N.J. Final Plan, supra note 96, at 53-54. Waiver of the minimum
limit, unlike waiver of the maximum limits, would permit the defendant to be tried within 30
days, thus ensuring his, and the public's, speedy trial rights. Only the Connecticut Plan provides
that the minimum time limit is waivable by the defendant. D. Conn. Final Plan, supra note 88, at
VI-4. The Eastern District rejected the idea of a minimum limit and stated that the minimum
period in which trial should commence should remain within the trial judge's discretion.
E.D.N.Y. Final Plan, supra note 97, at VI-2.
239. Waiver of the Act is frequently accompanied by forfeiture of the sixth amendment
speedy trial guarantee. See United States v. Poulack, 556 F.2d 83, 84 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 434
U.S. 986 (1977); United States v. Beberfeld, 408 F. Supp. 1119, 1121 (S.D.N.Y. 1976).
240. 18 U.S.C. § 3173 (1976) provides: "No provision of this chapter shall be interpreted as a
bar to any claim of denial of speedy trial as required by amendment VI of the Constitution." In
determining whether a defendant's constitutional right to speedy trial has been violated, the
Supreme Court has enunciated four factors which the court must consider: length of delay, reason
for delay, defendant's assertion of his right, and prejudice to the defendant. Barker v. Wingo, 407
U.S. 514, 530 (1972). Practically, the lower courts have "considerable discretion" in interpreting
these factors, and claims of a violation of the constitutional right to speedy trial "are rarely
successful." Russ & Mandelkern, supra note 1, at 6; see ConstitutionalRight, supra note 41, at
688-94. A valid affirmative waiver of the sixth amendment right to speedy trial deprives the
defendant of the ability to claim a violation of that right. See, e.g., Francis v. Henderson, 425
U.S. 536, 548 n.2 (1976) (Brernan, J., dissenting); Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218,
235-46 (1973); Uviller, supra note 179, at 1391, 1400.
241. See United States v. Beberfeld, 408 F. Supp. 1119, 1122-23 (S.D.N.Y. 1976); notes
275-80 infra and accompanying text.
242. See notes 304, 317 infra and accompanying text.
243. See 1978 Speedy Trial Report, supra note 10, at A5.
244. The District of New Jersey has interpreted this provision to require that the defendant
move to dismiss not less than ten days prior to the trial date. D.N.J. Final Plan, supra note 96, at
10-11. See generally 1978 Speedy Trial Report, supra note 10, at AS. The Eastern District of
New York and the District of Connecticut, on the other hand, require only that the motion be
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contendere shall be deemed to constitute a waiver of that privilege. 2 46 Voluntary pretrial waiver of the Act by a defendant might therefore be properly
inferred from this language.2 47 The argument contends that because a defendant may inadvertently waive by failing to move for dismissal within the
specified time period, Congress must have presumed that the defendant could
affirmatively waive the provisions of the Act. 248 Moreover, it has also been
argued that because the defendant is accorded the right to move for dismissal,
24 9
he thereby should be accorded the right to forfeit this statutory privilege.
The legislative history of the Act indicates that Congress paid scant attention to the subject of waiver. The only reference to its propriety is found in
the House hearings on the Act 250 which discussed a report evidencing some
concern that waiver would subvert the public right to speedy trials.25s The
report declared that a defendant should not be permitted to waive the Act
"except in highly unusual circumstances.12 S 2 Nevertheless, it failed to discuss
the exceptional circumstances which would justify a decision to waive.
Given the ambiguity of congressional intent, it is not surprising that the
final plans of the three districts differ in their treatment of pretrial waiver of
the Act. Although the Final Plans of the Districts of Connecticut and New
Jersey are silent on the matter, the Final Plan of the Eastern District of New
made prior to trial. See D. Conn. Final Plan, supra note 88, at 11-14 to -15; E.D.N.Y. Final Plan,
supra note 97, at 11-15.
245. A guilty plea constitutes a waiver of the defendant's constitutional right to speedy trial.
United States v. Lee, 500 F.2d 586, 587 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1003 (1974); Becker v.
State, 435 F.2d 157, 157 (8th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 402 U.S. 981 (1971); Green v. Wyrick, 414
F. Supp. 343, 352, aff'd, 542 F.2d 1178 (1976); see Note, The Waivability by Guilty Plea of
Retroactively Endowed Constitutional Rights, 41 Alb. L. Rev. 115, 116, 120-21, 138 (1977)
[hereinafter cited as Waivability]; Note, I Swear That I'm Guilty, So Help Me God: The Oath in
Rule 11 Proceedings, 46 Fordham L. Rev. 1242, 1243-44 (1978); Note, The Right to a Speedy
Trial, 20 Stan. L. Rev. 476, 478-80 (1968) [hereinafter cited as Right].

246. 18 U.S.C. § 3162(a)(2) (1976) provides: "If a defendant is not brought to trial within the
time limit required by section 3161(c) as extended by section 3161(h), the information or indictment shall be dismissed on motion of the defendant.... Failure of the defendant to move for
dismissal prior to trial or entry of a plea of guilty or nolo contendere shall constitute a waiver of
the right to dismissal under this section."
247.

Platt, supra note 1, at 772; see Suggestion, supra note 1, at 923 n.74.

248. Platt, supra note 1, at 772. Section 3162(a)(2), however, may also be interpreted to mean
that the time strictures should be extended only by § 3161(h). Steinberg, supra note 179, at 235.
See generally 1974 House Hearings, supra note 2, at 174 (statements of Sen. Ervin and Rep.
Conyers); ABA Standards, supra note 29, § 2.1.
249. Platt, supra note 1, at 772.
250. 1974 House Hearings, supra note 2, at 163-67 (discussing H.R. Rep. No. 358, 93d
Cong., 1st Sess. 150-54 (1973)).
251. The report stated: "The right to waiver of the speedy trial right should not be granted
solely to the defendant, for society has an equal interest in ensuring that a defendant is brought to
justice promptly. . . ." Id. at 164 (quoting H.R. Rep. No. 358, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 152 (1973)).
252. "The Committee firmly endorses the idea that the right to a speedy trial is an absolute
right, one that cannot be waived, except in highly unusual circumstances. Speedy trial statutes
must contain clearly defined guidelines, specifically enunciating... the amount of time permitted
to elapse before the required trial, acceptable reasons for delay, and the penalties for noncompliance." Id. (quoting H.R. Rep. No. 358, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 152 (1973)).
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York expressly permits a written waiver of the Act by a defendant. 2 3 The
Plan expressly requires, however, that the waiver be granted "in accordance
with the provisions of section 3161(h)(8) of the Speedy Trial Act. '25 4 Presumably, therefore, the waiver should be granted only if the trial court finds that
it serves the interests of justice.2 55 Unlike the grant of a section 3161(h)(8)
continuance, however, the waiver presumably nullifies the defendant's right
to move for dismissal under the Act for subsequent excessive delays.
In accordance with the plan, four out of six judges interviewed in Eastern

New York permit defendants to waive the Act. 256 Two of those judges as-

serted that the use of waiver saved the statute's constitutionality. They suggested that the excludable time provisions do not allow for continuances in
many situations where delay is clearly justified. One example cited was a
defendant's request for a continuance to obtain a particular attorney who was
unavailable for trial within the statutory limits. It was asserted that the
excludable time provisions, including the section 3161(h)(8) "interests of justice" catch-all, would not justify delay in this instance. The defendant, thereright to choice of counsel if
fore, would be deprived of his sixth amendment
25 7
he were not permitted to waive the Act.

In New Jersey and Connecticut, where the Plans do not address the permissibility of waiver, the interviews revealed opposite results. In New Jersey,
as in Eastern New York, six out of eight judges permitted defendants to
waive the Act. One of that majority, however, questioned the ultimate propriety of its use. 258 He noted that by permanently suspending the operation of
the statute's time limits, waiver can effectively render the Act meaningless;
the device is thus probably adverse to congressional intent. 25 9 Accordingly,
the judge predicted that the courts of appeals will refuse to permit waiver
after the final limits and sanctions become operative. The alternative, he
suggested, is the more extensive use of the excludable time limits, especially
the liberal application of section 3161(h)(8).
2 60
Because Connecticut immediately adopted the permanent time limits,

it

presumably should have been operating under more severe time pressures
than the Eastern District of New York or New Jersey. The district might
therefore be expected to employ additional methods, including waiver, to
253. In addition to the requirement that the waiver be in writing, the court must determine if
the waiver is voluntary by addressing the defendant in open court or in camera. The waiver is
initiated by a request from either the defendant or defense counsel. E.D.N.Y. Final Plan, supra
note 97, at 11-12. The Eastern District Final Plan differs from that of the Southern District of
New York, which expressly excludes waiver of the Act by the defendant, and declares that the
trial court may grant a continuance only pursuant to § 3161(h)(8). S.D.N.Y. Final Plan, supra
note 159, at 11-8.
254. E.D.N.Y. Final Plan, supra note 97, at 11-12; see notes 282-93 ilqfra and accompanying
text.
255. See 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(8) (1976).
256. The remaining two judges did not comment on their use of waiver.
257. Accord, Platt, supra note 1, at 770-71; see notes 294-301 infra and accompanying text.
258. Several judges in the Southern District of New York have also questioned the defendant's power to waive. Wall St. J., Sept. 1, 1977, at 28, col. 2.
259. See notes 266-72 infra and accompanying text.
260. See note 88 supra and accompanying text.
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alleviate the strain. Ironically, however, the judges interviewed in the district
refused to permit waiver. The Speedy Trial Reporter for the district
indicated that one judge not interviewed did permit defendants to waive
the Act but questioned its permissibility. 26 1 The judge nevertheless continued

to grant waivers because
of uncertainty as to the precise limits of the exclud262
able time provisions.
The interviews also reveal that the term "waiver" may be used to describe
procedures not within the traditional definition 263 of the term. Several judges
interviewed, in apparent deference to the statutory mandate of prompt dispositions, permit defendants to "waive" the Act only for a defined period of

time. 264 In essence, however, this practice incorporates a method already
encompassed in the Act. By tolling the operation of the time limits, the waiver
is a mere pseudonym for excludable time continuances. Nevertheless, in instances where a continuance would not be warranted under the excludable

time provisions, even this limited use of waiver circumvents the legislative
purpose.
B.

The Propriety of Waiver

The use of waiver to alleviate the Act's time pressures is contrary to congressional intent and should be prohibited. The concept of waiver proceeds
from the assumption that the right forfeited is personal to the individual

exercising the waiver. 26s The rights created under the Act, however, were not

intended to rest exclusively with the defendant. The Act was primarily designed to protect the public interest in speedy dispositions by preventing

undue delay in bringing criminal cases to trial.266 A major impetus for its
enactment was the congressional concern that the Supreme Court's interpretation of a defendant's sixth amendment right to a speedy trial did not adequately protect that societal interest. 2 67 Congress also recognized that many
261. Telephone Interview with Aviam Soifer, Speedy Trial Reporter for the District of
Connecticut (Jan. 25, 1979). Three assistant United States Attorneys interviewed also indicated
that a minority of judges utilize waiver.
262. Id. Presumably, the judge was apprehensive that the granting of the continuance would
be reversed upon appellate review.
263. See notes 234 & 240 supra.
264. Several judges employ another possibly more deleterious procedure. They permit defendants to waive a specific time interval of the Act, usually the arraignment-to-trial limit. In effect,
this practice nullifies the constraints of the Act.
265. See Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. 387, 404 (1977) (quoting Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S.
458, 464 (1938)); United States v. Hill, 310 F.2d 601, 603 (4th Cir. 1962); United States v.
Lustman, 258 F.2d 475, 478 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 358 U.S. 880 (1958); Levine v. United States,
182 F.2d 556, 558-59 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 340 U.S. 921 (1950); Waivability, supra note 245,
at 117. See generally Patton v. United States, 281 U.S. 276, 296-98 (1930).
266. 1974 Senate Report, supra note 2, at 21; 1974 House Report, supra note 2, at 8, 15-16,
reprinted in [1974] U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News at 7402, 7408-09; United States v. Lopez, 426
F. Supp. 380, 383 (S.D.N.Y. 1977); see ABA Standards, supra note 29, § 1.1; Ervin, supra note
62, at 298-99.
267. "The task of balancing [the Supreme Court] factors and arriving at a conclusion which is
fair in all cases is a difficult task. [The Supreme Court test] provides no guidance to either the
defendant or the criminal justice system. It is, in effect, a neutral test which reinforces the
legitimacy of delay." 1974 House Report, supra note 2, at 11-12, reprinted in [19741 U.S. Code
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criminal defendants do not share the public's interest in speed. 268 Defendants
often desire delay, hopeful that prosecution witnesses will become unavailable
or that essential evidentiary documents will be lost. 2 6 9 Accordingly, many
defendants will never demand their speedy trial rights. 27 0 To eliminate that
possibility, Congress provided that the time limits commence without demand
by the defendant. 271 By permitting a permanent suspension of the time limits,
however, waiver is antithetical to that congressional design. 272 Through use
of the device, a defendant effectively regains control over the operation of the
statutory constraints. Even the most liberal interpretation cannot justify relinquishment by one not the primary beneficiary
of rights that were originally
273
constructed to preclude such manipulation.
Prosecutors and defendants have argued that agreement by the United
States Attorney and the trial court to a defendant's waiver of the Act will
ensure society's right to prompt dispositions. 27 4 This argument presumes that
the interests of the United States Attorney and the court in speed are consistent with that of the public. The fallacy of that premise, however, is readily
apparent. Courts and prosecutors often have little more incentive than defenCong. & Ad. News at 7405; see 1974 Senate Report, supra note 2, at 14-15; 1974 House Report,
supra note 2, at 16, reprinted in [1974] U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News at 7410; Frase, supra note
1, at 667-69, 673-74; Constitutional Right, supra note 41, at 662, 688-94.
268. 1974 House Report, supra note 2, at 14-15, reprinted in [1974] U.S. Code Cong. & Ad.
News at 7407-08; see Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 521 (1972); Frase, supra note 1, at 668;
Constitutional Right, supra note 41, at 684.
269. See Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 521 (1972); Banfield & Anderson, Continuances in
the Cook County Criminal Courts, 35 U. Chi. L. Rev. 259, 261-65 (1968); Note, The Impact of
Speedy Trial Provisions: A Tentative Appraisal, 8 Colum. J.L. & Soc. Prob. 356, 372-73 (1972)
[hereinafter cited as Appraisall; Vital Right, supra note 1, at 352-53.
270. Many courts required the defendant to demand a speedy trial before he could assert a
claim that his speedy trial rights had been violated. See Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 525
(1972). The Court in Barker, however, expressly rejected this requirement. The Court declared
that the defendant's demand for trial is merely one factor in the determination of whether the
defendant has been deprived of his constitutional right. Id. at 529-30. Even under the Barker
guidelines, however, if the defendant fails to assert the speedy trial right, it will be difficult to
prove a denial of the sixth amendment guarantee. Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. at 532; Uviller,
supra note 179, at 1388; see ConstitutionalRight, supra note 41, at 688-94. See also 1974 Senate
Report, supra note 2, at 14-15.
271. See 18 U.S.C. § 3161(b)-(c) (1976); Frase, supra note 1, at 669; Suggestion, supra note 1,
at 912.
272. In United States v. Beberfeld, 408 F. Supp. 1119, 1122-24 (S.D.N.Y. 1976), the court
indicated that a defendant could not waive the speedy trial right under the Second Circuit Rules
for Prompt Disposition of Criminal Cases. In dictum, the court analogized the purposes of these
Rules to the Speedy Trial Act, and reasoned that because the Rules protected the public interest
in speedy trial, waiver by the defendant should be denied. Id. at 1122-24. The court phrased the
issue as whether "the rule bestow[s] upon the defendant a personal right which is hers to waive,
or is... intended to further a public interest which extends beyond a concern for the rights of a
defendant, and hence is not subject to waiver." Id. at 1122.
273. See Uviller, supra note 179, at 1379.
274. See Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 527 (1972); United States v. Beberfeld, 408 F.
Supp. 1119, 1122-23 (S.D.N.Y. 1976).
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dants to expedite dispositions.27 5 Prosecutors are often favorably disposed to a

defendant's request for delay, since this provides additional time to negotiate

a plea. 276 Moreover, courts and prosecutors often use delay as a tactic to

balance their often burdensome caseloads. 277 Because a court which grants

waiver is not thereafter subject to the restrictions of the Act, waiver can
effectively alleviate the strain of overcrowded dockets.2 7 Several judges interviewed declared that the device enabled them to place cases at the end of

their trial lists for scheduling at a time which is more convenient. In these
279

instances, waiver effectively circumvents an express prohibition of the Act,
which precludes the court from granting a continuance for calendar congestion. 280 The device thus cannot acquire legitimacy simply through the assent
of two parties who may disfavor speed as much as the defendant. 28 '
Waiver is also inconsistent with the legislative scheme. The statute expressly delineates excludable time provisions 28 2 which were designed to avoid
prejudice to the parties caused by unduly harsh operation of the time limits. 283 In addition, in those instances not listed as specific grounds for delay,
the section 3161(h)(8) "catch-all" provision allows the trial court to grant a
continuance if, in the interests of justice, delay is necessary. As one court has

noted, this comprehensive list of exceptions "compel[s] the conclusion that it
was intended to exhaust the permissible reasons for delay. It makes waivers
275. United States v. Beberfeld, 408 F. Supp. 1119, 1122-23 (S.D.N.Y. 1976); see 1974
Senate Report, supra note 2, at 9, 12.
276. Some assistant United States Attorneys indicated that a plea is more desirable than going
to trial because a trial takes more time and the verdict is always uncertain. But see Wall St. J.,
Sept. 1, 1977, at 28, col. 2.
277. The courts are pressured to try cases within the time limits, as court congestion is not a
ground for a continuance. 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(8)(C) (1976); see United States ex rel.
Frizer v.
McMann, 437 F.2d 1312, 1315 (2d Cir. 1971) (en banc). The purpose of the statutory limitation
on the discretion of the trial court is to prevent abuse of the § 3161(h)(8) "catch-all" provision.
1974 House Report, supra note 2, at 22, reprinted in [1974 U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News at
7415.
278. Although a court may transfer cases to alleviate the pressure of its caseload, "in smaller
districts reassignment may be impracticable, and even in larger ones Judges are reluctant to
impose the burden [of reassignments] on their fellows, who are already dealing with full calendars
and short time limits." Report on Problems, supra note 89, at 2.
279. The interviews did not reveal, however, that the practice of placing the waived case at
the end of the trial lst was deliberately used to circumvent the strictures of the Act. Additionally,
some judges required "good cause" before permitting waiver, in an apparent attempt to justify
the waiver by applying standards similar to those required by § 3161(h)(8). See note 264 supra.
280. 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(8XC) (1976). Even if the Act did not expressly preclude a continuance for court calendar congestion, some judges indicated that such continuances would not
be as useful as waivers for the purpose of delay. When the reason for the continuance is ended,
the court would have to try the case within the remaining limits, which might fall within a

particularly congested calendar period.
281. See Frase, supra note 1, at 698; Lacey, supra note 1, at 13.
282. 18 U.S.C. § 3161(b)(1)-(8) (1976); see United States v. Beberfeld, 408 F. Supp. 1119,
1123 (S.D.N.Y. 1976).
283. 1974 House Report, supra note 2, at 22, reprinted in [1974] U.S. Code Cong. & Ad.
News at 7415; see Russ & Mandelkern, supra note 1, at 26.
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unnecessary
in those instances where a further extension of time is jus284
tified."

Moreover, the excludable time provisions contain checks on their abuse

that are not applicable to the use of waiver. 28 - A statutory continuance merely
tolls the running of the time limits until the reason for the extension has
ended .2 86 Thereafter, the operation of the time limits resumes, and the defendant retains his right to move for dismissal of the charges for any further
unjustified delay. Even in cases where an "interests of justice" continuance is
applicable, section 3161(h)(8) places stringent requirements on the trial
court. 28 7 Although the provision is broad in scope, 28 8 it expressly requires that
the trial court establish "in the record of the case, either orally or in writing,
its reasons for finding that the ends of justice served by the granting of such
continuance outweigh the best interests of the public and the defendant in a
speedy trial.128 9 The court's reasons for granting the continuance are subject
to appellate review to ensure that the public interest in speed has not been
subverted. 290 Finally, section 3161(h)(8) expressly forbids
a court to grant a
29 1
continuance because of court calendar congestion.
Upon the exercise of a waiver, however, the Act ceases to bind either the
parties or the judge. 29 2 The statutory time strictures and the excludable time
provisions, with their attendant requirements, are effectively nullified. Moreover, an appellate court, in determining the propriety of a waiver, can ask
only whether the waiver was voluntary and knowingly made; 293 the reasons
why it was granted are irrelevant. Consideration of the public's interest in
prompt dispositions, incorporated into the statutory framework of the Act, is
thus precluded. To avoid this violation of congressional intent, courts should
284. United States v. Beberfeld, 408 F. Supp. 1119, 1124 (S.D.N.Y. 1976).
285. Id. at 1123; see United States v. Lasker, 481 F.2d 229, 234 (2d Cir. 1973), cert. denied,
415 U.S. 975 (1974).
286. 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h) (1976); see 1974 House Report, supra note 2, at 8, reprinted in
[1974] U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News at 7402.
287. Hansen & Reed, supra note 1, at 412; see 1974 House Report, supra note 2, at 22,
reprinted in [19741 U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News at 7415.
288. In determining the propriety of a § 3161(h)(8) continuance, the trial court "is not restricted to factors set forth under [§ 3161(h)(8)(B)] in its determination as to whether the ends of
justice [are] served by the granting of [the] continuance." Committee on the Administration of the
Criminal Law of the Judicial Conference of the United States, Guidelines to the Administration of
the "Speedy Trial Act of 1974" at 27 (1977).
289. 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(8)(A) (1976).
290. The standards of review applicable to the provision, however, are undefined. Frase,
supra note 1, at 698.
291. 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(8XC) (1976); see 1974 House Report, supra note 2, at 22, reprinted
in [1974] U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News at 7415.
292. See note 238 supra and accompanying text.
293. Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 525, 529 (1972); see Carnley v. Cochran, 369 U.S. 506,
516 (1962); Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464 (1938). Some commentators have suggested that
additional methods of waiving speedy trial guarantees may exist. See Tigar, Waiver of Constitutional Rights: Disquiet in the Citadel, 84 Harv. L. Rev. 1, 7-25 (1970); ConstitutionalRight,
supra note 41, at 688; Right, supra note 245, at 478-79. There is, however, a presumption against
inadvertent waiver of the sixth amendment right. Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 525, 529
(1972).
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employ the excludable time provisions of the Act as the exclusive means to
grant justified continuances.
Supporters of waiver have marshalled several constitutional arguments to
justify its use. Least persuasive is the contention that waiver of the speedy
trial guarantees established by the Act is properly inferred from the defendant's ability to waive the sixth amendment right to speedy trial. 294 The
rights protected by the Act differ markedly from those ensured by the sixth
amendment. 295 Although the sixth amendment recognizes a societal interest in
prompt dispositions, it primarily safeguards the defendant's speedy trial
right. 296 As such, the amendment is properly waivable by a defendant. 297 As
noted above, however, because of the Act's greater concern for society's interest in speedy justice, 298 a defendant should
not be permitted to waive
299
rights that are not his alone to relinquish.
A more fundamental argument contends that waiver is necessary to preserve the constitutionality of the Act. Specifically, it is asserted that the excludable time provisions do not allow delay in many circumstances where
denial of a continuance would deprive the defendant of his rights to assistance
and choice of counsel as well as due process of law. 300 If the defendant cannot
in those instances free himself from the statutory constraints through the
expedient of waiver, the argument proceeds, the Act is to that extent unconstitutional. 30 1 Deprivation of the right to waive the Act, however, does not
necessarily infringe the defendant's constitutional rights.
294. See Platt, supra note 1, at 722.
295. Generally, in states which establish statutory time limits for the prompt disposition of
criminal cases, the courts have upheld the defendant's right to waive the statute's strictures.
Many of these state statutes, however, ensure the defendant's sixth amendment speedy trial rights
and are interpreted, as is the sixth amendment, as involving the personal right of the defendant.
E.g., State v. Lyles, 225 N.W.2d 124, 125-26 (Iowa 1975); State v. Harper, 473 S.W.2d 419, 424
(Mo. 1971); State v. Hicks, 353 Mo. 950, 950, 185 S.W.2d 650, 651 (1945); People v. White, 2 N.Y.2d
220, 223-24, 140 N.E.2d 258, 260-61, 159 N.Y.S.2d 168, 172-73, appeal dismissed, 353 U.S. 969
(1957); see Appraisal, supra note 269, at 360-61; Annot., 57 A.L.R.2d 302 (1958). Those state
statutes which recognize a public right to a speedy trial, e.g., N.Y. Code Crirm. Proc. §
30.30(4)(b) (McKinney Supp. 1978-1979), are also distinguishable from the Act in at least one
other respect. "The enforcement of such standards . . .is generally left entirely to the judge;
unlike the Act, no reviewable record of his reasoning is required." Frase, supra note 1, at 699
(footnote omitted).
296. Frase, supra note 1, at 668; see Uviller, supra note 179, at 1378-79.
297. See cases cited note 265 supra.
298. See notes 266-72 supra and accompanying text.
299. See Uviller, supra note 179, at 1379.
300. Platt, supra note 1, at 768; see 1978 Speedy Trial Report, supra note 10, at 13-14.
301. See Platt, supra note 1, at 764-66, 771; note 257 supra and accompanying text. The Act
has also been attacked as "an unconstitutional legislative encroachment on the judiciary." United
States v. Howard, 440 F. Supp. 1106, 1109 (D. Md. 1977), aff'd, No. 78-5047 (4th Cir. Jan. 16,
1979); accord, Platt, supra note 1, at 767-68; see United States v. Martinez, 538 F.2d 921, 923 &
n.4 (2d Cir. 1976). The Howard court contended that the Act violates the separation of powers
doctrine because Congress cannot "unduly interfere with purely judicial functions," and specifically, cannot establish timetables for judicial action. 440 F. Supp. at 1109-13. One commentator,
however, has disagreed, arguing that under article III of the Constitution, Congress has the
primary responsibility over court administration. 91 Harv. L. Rev. 1925 (1978).
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Proper application of the excludable time provisions of the Act can adequately safeguard defendant's constitutional rights without resort to waiver.30 2 Section 3161(h)(8) provides that continuances may be granted when necessary to prevent a "miscarriage of justice." Violation of the Constitution is
perhaps the most obvious example of the contingencies that this provision was
designed to forestall. 30 3 The legislative history of the Act expressly indicates
that the miscarriage of justice provision was intended to prevent the harsh
operation of the time limits upon the defendant. 30 4 Thus, in instances where
delay is required to uphold the defendant's constitutional guarantees, excludable time should be granted.3 0 s A brief examination of several constitutional
privileges that may be infringed absent reasonable delays will illustrate the
adequacy of the statutory solution.
The right to effective assistance of counsel is among the guarantees protected by a section 3161(h)(8) continuance. 30 6 This privilege, which includes the
right to prepare an adequate defense, 30 7 falls "within the parameters" of the
sixth amendment 3 8 and due process clause of the fifth amendment. 30 9 Pur302. See 65 A.B.A. J. 23 (1979). "When the validity of an act of the Congress is drawn in
question, and even if a serious doubt of constitutionality is raised, it is a cardinal principle that
this Court will first ascertain whether a construction of the statute is fairly possible by which the
question may be avoided." Ashwander v. Tennessee Valley Auth., 297 U.S. 288, 348 (1936)
(Brandeis, J.,concurring) (quoting Crowell v. Benson, 28 U.S. 22, 62 (1931)); see Regional Rail
Reorganization Act Cases, 419 U.S. 102, 134 (1974); Civil Serv. Comm'n v. National Ass'n of
Letter Carriers, 413 U.S. 548, 571 (1973); United States v. Vuitch, 402 U.S. 62, 70 (1971).
303. See 1974 Senate Report, supra note 2, at 21, 39, 40; 1974 House Report, supra note 2,
at 14-15, 19-23, 33-34, reprinted in [1974] U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News at 7407-08, 7412-16,
7426.
304. 1974 Senate Report, supra note 2, at 39; 1974 House Report, supra note 2, at 22,
reprinted in [1974] U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News at 7415.
305. The House Report stated that use of the miscarriage of justice provision should be
denied if the trial court determined that "the defendant participated actively in the delay," since
no miscarriage of justice would result from the defendant's own dilatory actions. 1974 House
Report, supra note 2, at 34, reprinted in [1974] U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News at 7426. When the
defendant deliberately causes delay, there is no deprivation of his constitutional right to speedy
trial. See Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 529 (1972); United States v. Lustig, 555 F.2d 737, 744
(9th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1045 (1978); United States v. Uptain, 531 F.2d 1281, 1290
(5th Cir. 1976); Kroll v. United States, 433 F.2d 1282, 1286 (5th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 402
U.S. 944 (1971). See generally Banfield & Anderson, supra note 269, at 263-72; Gorman,
Excessive Delay in the Courts: Toward a Continuance Policy Relating to Counsel and Parties, 21
Clev. St. L. Rev. 118, 126, 130 (No. 3, 1972).
306. In re Ford, No. 78-3011, slip op. at 4-5 (2d Cir. Mar. 30, 1978).
307. See White v. Ragen, 324 U.S. 760, 764 (1945); Avery v. Alabama, 308 U.S. 444; 446
(1940); Gandy v. Alabama, 569 F.2d 1318, 1328 (Sth Cir. 1978). In United States v. Burtorn; 584
F.2d 485 (D.C. Cir. 1978), the court stated: "[Ihf preparation time is unreasonably short, counsel
cannot competently represent his client, and may make negligent omissions or acts that deprive
defendant of his constitutional right to the assistance of counsel for his defense." Id. at 489 n. 10;
see United States v. Fessel, 531 F.2d 1275, 1281 (5th Cir. 1976); United States v. DeCoster, 487
F.2d 1197, 1204 (D.C. Cir. 1973); Finer, Ineffective Assistance of Counsel, 58 Cornell L. Rev.
1077, 1089-93 (1973); Lacey, supra note 1, at 13; Report on Problems, supra note 89, at 8; Wall
St. J., Sept. 1, 1977, at 28, col. 2.
308. United States v. Burton, 584 F.2d 485, 489 n.10 (D.C. Cir. 1978); see McMann v.
Richardson, 397 U.S. 759, 771 (1970); Reece v. Georgia, 350 U.S. 85, 90 (1955); Glasser v.
United States, 315 U.S. 60, 69-70 (1942); Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 57 (1932). See
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suant to this right, however, "[clounsel is not entitled to unlimited preparation

time," but only "reasonable preparation time." 310 In construing that constitutional right, courts will not permit a continuance if the delay would interfere
with the court's orderly disposition of its cases. 31 1 Courts usually consider the
following factors in the determination of reasonable preparation time under
the right to counsel clause: the time available for preparation; likelihood of
prejudice absent the continuance; 3 12 the accused's role in causing the delay;
complexity of the case; and the availability, skill, and experience of the
attorney. 3 13 As discussed above, section 3161(h)(8) also permits reasonable,
3 14
limited continuances to provide a defendant with adequate time to prepare.
315
The factors proposed in the foregoing section
to determine the propriety of
such delays are substantially similar to those enunciated pursuant to the
constitutional guarantee. When denial of additional time is sufficiently prejuof
dicial to infringe the defendant's sixth amendment right, 3 16 the miscarriage 317
justice provision should always warrant a section 3161(h)(8) continuance.

The right to choice of counsel has also been recognized as an integral part
of the sixth amendment right to the assistance of counsel and due process
generally Banfield & Anderson, supra note 269, at 267-68; Schaefer, Federalism and State
Criminal Procedure, 70 Harv. L. Rev. 1, 8 (1956).
309. "[T]he right to counsel theme of the due process clause has at least four important
variations: the right to have counsel, the right to a minimal quality of counsel, the right to a
reasonable opportunity to select and be represented by chosen counsel, and the right to a preparation period sufficient to assure at least a minimal quality of counsel." Gandy v. Alabama, 569
F.2d 1318, 1323 (5th Cir. 1978).
310. United States v. Burton, 584 F.2d 485, 489 n. 10 (D.C. Cir. 1978); see In re Sutter, 543
F.2d 1030, 1035 (2d Cir. 1976).
311. United States v. Burton, 584 F.2d 485, 489 n.10 (D.C. Cir. 1978).
312. Actual prejudice to the defendant, absent a claim of incompetence of the attorney, would
probably have to be shown in order to reverse because of insufficient time to prepare a defense.
See Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42, 53-54 (1970). But see Hawk v. Olson, 326 U.S. 271
(1945); Finer, supra note 307, at 1089.
313. United States v. Valker, 559 F.2d 365, 370-71 (5th Cir. 1977); United States v. Uptain,
531 F.2d 1281, 1286-89 (5th Cir. 1976); Sanders v. United States, 415 F.2d 621, 629 (5th Cir.
1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 976 (1970); Bowman v. United States, 409 F.2d 225. 226 (5th Cir.
1969), cert. denied, 398 U.S. 967 (1970).
314. See notes 202-13 supra and accompanying text.
315. See notes 214-16 supra and accompanying text.
316. See United States v. Burton, 584 F.2d 485, 488-89 (D.C. Cir. 1978); Platt, supra note 1,
at 770; Report on Problems, supra note 89, at 7-8; Southern District Evaluation, supra note 1, at
519-20.
317. Congress anticipated the possibility that an attorney would need additional time to
prepare: "[W]hen a defendant's counsel ... fails to properly prepare his client's case, either he or
the defendant might seek a continuance on the ground that forcing the defendant to go to trial on
the date scheduled would deny the defendant the benefits of a prepared counsel." 1974 House
Report, supra note 2, at 33, reprinted in [19741 U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News at 7426. The
Senate Report expressly authorizes the granting of a section 3161(h)(8) continuance where the
"defense counsel... is ill or unable to continue, or ... has been permitted by the court to resign
from the case, or the court has removed counsel from the case." 1974 Senate Report, supra note 2,
at 40; see In re Ford, No. 78-3011, slip op. at 5 (2d Cir. Mar. 30, 1978); Russ & Mandelkern,
supra note 1, at 22.
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clause of the fifth amendment. 31 8 The privilege of selecting and retaining a
particular attorney, however, is not absolute. 3 19 Similar to the right of adequate preparation, it may not unreasonably delay the proceedings and thereby
deprive courts of their power to control the efficient administration of justice. 3 20 In considering what constitutes a reasonable continuance to obtain
particular counsel, 3 21 the courts have traditionally utilized factors which are
similar to those suggested by the Second Circuit Guidelines to determine the
propriety of a section 3161(h)(8) continuance. 32 2 The constitutional factors
include: length of delay;, availability of substitute counsel; prior continuances
granted; inconvenience to the litigants, witnesses, counsel, and court; material
prejudice to the defendant absent the delay; complexity of the case; and
legitimacy of the reasons for the request. 323 Moreover, several courts, in
applying these factors, have employed a balancing test to determine the reasonableness of a continuance under which the public's interest in prompt
3 24
dispositions is weighed against the defendant's interest in selecting counsel.
That test essentially mirrors the considerations necessary to justify a section
to
3161(h)(8) continuance. Such a continuance, therefore, should be available
3 25
prevent a constitutional violation of the right to choice of counsel.
Finally, in situations not involving adequate preparation time or right to
counsel, denial of a continuance may still violate a defendant's right to due
process of law. 326 Here again, waiver is unnecessary to provide the required
318. United States v. Burton, 584 F.2d 485, 489-90 (D.C. Cir. 1978); see Crooker v.
California, 357 U.S. 433, 439 (1958); Chandler v. Fretag, 348 U.S. 3, 10 (1954); Powell v.
Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 53, 71 (1932).
319. United States v. Burton, 584 F.2d 485, 489 (D C. Cir. 1978); Gandy v. Alabama, 569
F.2d 1318, 1323 (5th Cir. 1978); United States v. Poulack, 556 F.2d 83, 86 (1st Cir.), cert.
denied, 434 U.S. 986 (1977); United States v. Tortora, 464 F.2d 1202, 1210 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 409 U.S. 1063 (1972); United States ex rel. Carey v. Rundle, 409 F.2d 1210, 1215 (3d Cir.
1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 946 (1970).
320. United States v. Burton, 584 F.2d 485, 489-90 (D.C. Cir. 1978); Gandy v. Alabama, 569
F.2d 1318, 1323 (1978); United States v. Poulack, 556 F.2d 83, 86 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 434
U.S. 986 (1977); see United States v. Lustig, 555 F.2d 737, 744 (9th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434
U.S. 1045 (1978).
321. Generally, the grant of a continuance is in the discretion of the trial court. United States
v. Siegel, 587 F.2d 721, 728 (5th Cir. 1979); that discretion, however, cannot be abused. See
Ungar v. Sarafite, 376 U.S. 575, 589 (1964).
322. See notes 226-29 supra and accompanying text.
323. United States v. Burton, 584 F.2d 485, 490-91 (I).C. Cir. 1978); Gandy v. Alabama, 569
F.2d 1318, 1324 (5th Cir. 1978); Giacalone v. Lucas, 445 F.2d 1238, 1240 (6th Cir. 1971), cerl.
denied, 405 U.S. 922 (1972).
324. United States v. Burton, 584 F.2d 485, 490-92 (D.C. Cir. 1978); Giacalone v. Lucas, 445
F.2d 1238, 1240 (6th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 922 (1972). "Desirable as it is that a
defendant obtain private counsel of his own choice, that goal must be weighed and balanced
against an equally desired public need for the efficient and effective administration of criminal
justice." United States v. Poulack, 556 F.2d 83, 86 (1st Cir.) (quoting United States ex rel. Carey
v. Rundle, 409 F.2d 1210, 1214 (3d Cir. 1969)), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 986 (1977). This public
interest "has great force" in determining whether a continuance should be granted. United States
v. Burton, 584 F.2d at 489.
325. See Revised Second Circuit Guidelines, supra note 219, at 37. See generally 65 A.B.A. J.
23 (1979).
326. See Platt, supra note 1, at 768.
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delay. The House Report expressly states: "The word speedy does not . . .
denote assembly-line justice, but efficiency in the processing of cases which is
commensurate with due process. '327 For example, the publicity surrounding a
criminal case may make it impossible to commence trial within the statutory
time limits. Although the defendant might be amply prepared, with no desire
to procure a new attorney, his due process rights would be protected only if
trial were scheduled at a later date. 328 Given the legislative intent, the propriety of a section 3161(h)(8) continuance to alleviate the prejudicial impact of
that publicity would seem unquestionable.
In sum, waiver is an unnecessary and undesirable device to protect the
legitimate interests of defendants in delay. The ends of justice and miscarriage
of justice provisions of section 3161(h)(8) are sufficiently broad to permit
continuances whenever reasonable extensions of the statutory time limits are
required. Moreover, Congress could not have intended to superimpose the
device of waiver upon an already comprehensive statutory scheme. To the
contrary, by permitting the defendant to suspend the operation of the Act for
the duration of the proceedings, waiver thwarts the public interest in speedy
dispositions, and to that extent is antithetical to congressional intent. To
prevent further subversion of the statutory purpose, Congress should clarify
the Act to preclude the use of waiver.
CONCLUSION

Enforcement of the Speedy Trial Act in the districts of Eastern New York,

Connecticut, and New Jersey, although not free from difficulty, has largely
proven successful. Many of the adverse effects upon civil litigation foretold by
the Act's detractors have not materialized. More importantly, the difficulties
encountered, especially by defendants and their counsel, are not insurmountable. Hence, if the three districts studied are at all representative, the repeated and variegated calls for amendment of the Act seem unwarranted.
Of course, the conclusions of this study must be qualified. Because the
sanction of dismissal for excessive delay is not yet effective, 329 analysis of the
districts' efforts to comply with the time limits is beset with pitfalls-the
threat of dismissal may provoke unforeseen difficulties. 330 In addition, during
most of the period under scrutiny, Eastern New York and New Jersey had
327. 1974 House Report, supra note 2, at 15, reprinted in [1974] U.S. Code Cong. & Ad.
News at 7408. "[Slection 3165(b) of the bill specifically mandates that the planning process seek to
avoid underenforcement, overenforcement, and discriminatory enforcement of the law. The
Committee believes that both delay and haste in the processing of criminal cases must be avoided;
neither of these tactics inures to the benefit of the defendant, the Government, the courts nor
society." Id.
328.

Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539, 553 (1975); Groppi v. Wisconsin, 400

U.S. 505, 510 (1971); Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333, 363 (1966); Estes v. Texas, 381 U.S.
532, 536 (1965); Rideau v. Louisiana, 373 U.S. 723, 727 (1963); Irvin v. Dowd, 366 U.S. 717,
725-29 (1961).

329. The sanctions for noncompliance with the Act's time limits do not become effective until
July 1, 1979. 18 U.S.C. § 3163(c) (1976).
330. See 1978 Management Statistics, supra note 99, at 13.
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not yet adopted the permanent limits; 3 3 1 that their successful operation under
the Act will continue after 1979 accordingly must be viewed as a reasonable
prediction. Finally, the study is only a sampling. The strains on courts, defendants, and prosecutors fostered by the Act are not easily catalogued even
in an examination of three jurisdictions, and it is not suggested that the
foregoing observations necessarily reflect the experience of all districts.
Nevertheless, even if the deleterious effects of the Act exceed those indicated by this study, amendment remains a premature solution in view of
several alternative methods that can be employed to reduce court congestion
and, as a result, the stress on defendants and prosecutors. In response to the
pleas of the federal courts to reduce their growing congestion, Congress recently passed the Omnibus Judgeship Act of 1978.332 Under this statute, new
trial judgeships are created in most federal districts. 333 These additional
judgeships should absorb a large part of the increasing civil filings and decrease criminal caseloads per judge, thereby permitting greater scheduling
flexibility. In addition, increases in the number and use of magistrates, as
permitted under the Federal Magistrates Act, 334 can also reduce backlogs.
Finally, congressional determination of the propriety of the permanent limits
should not ignore the bills to abolish the diversity jurisdiction of the federal
courts. 335 That legislation, if enacted, will drastically reduce federal civil
calendars 336 and can only ameliorate any prejudicial impact of the Act upon
331. See notes 110-12 supra and accompanying text.
332. Pub. L. 95-486, 92 Stat. 1629 (1978) (to be codified in 28 U.S.C. §§ 44, 133).
333. The legislation has provided for one judge each in both Eastern New York and Connecticut, and two additional judgeships in New Jersey. Id. § 11(a).
334. 28 U.S.C. §§ 631-639 (1976). Civil actions may be assigned to magistrate for all pretrinl
purposes with appeal to the district court only if the magistrate's ruling is "clearly erroneous or
contrary to law." Id. § 636(b)(1)(A); see United States v. Jones, 581 F.2d 816, 818 (10th Cir.
1978); Taylor v. Oxford, 575 F.2d 152, 154 (7th Cir. 1978); Carmena v. International Union of
Operating Eng'rs Local 406, 572 F.2d 1031, 1032 (5th Cir. 1978); Kendall v. Davis, 569 F.2d
1330, 1331 (5th Cir. 1978). Furthermore, motions which would be case dispositive (e.g., motion
for summary judgement) may be referred to the magistrate who may then recommend the appropriate action to the district court. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B) (1976); Mitchell v. Beaubouef, 581
F.2d 412, 415 (5th Cir. 1978); Rees v. District Court, 572 F.2d 700, 701 (9th Cir. 1978). Some
have advocated broader powers for the magistrates. 1978 Speedy Trial Report, supra note 10, at
28; Address by Warren E. Burger, Chief Justice of the United States, American Bar Association
Midyear Meeting (Feb. 11, 1979). In fact, a recent Senate bill to increase the use of magistrates,
S. 1613, 95th Cong., 1st Sess., was passed by the House of Representatives in slightly amended
form and is now in a joint conference committee. Diversity of CitizenshipJurisdiction/Magistrate
Reform: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Courts, Civil Liberties and the Administration of
Justice of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 36-44 (1977).
335. See, e.g., S. 2389, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. (1978); H.R. 9622, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. (1978);
S. 2094, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977); H.R. 9123, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977). Chief Justice
Burger has also called for the curtailment of diversity jurisdiction. Address by Warren E. Burger,
Chief Justice of the United States, American Bar Association Midyear Meeting (Feb. 11, 1979);
accord, H. Friendly, Federal Jurisdiction: A General View 147-48 (1973); Shapiro, Federal Diversity Jurisdiction: A Survey and a Proposal, 91 Harv. L. Rev. 317, 329 (1977).
336. Diversity jurisdiction accounted for 31,678 civil filings out of 130,597 total civil filings in
1977. 1977 Administrative Office Report, supra note 126, at A-14. This represents almost 25% of
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civil litigants. Although the success of these alternatives in decreasing judicial
backlogs is presently a matter for speculation, the likelihood that they will
free courts from at least some of the constraints caused by the Act renders
amendment unnecessary at this date.
Perhaps the two most preferable alternatives to amendment are found in
the Act itself. First, the Act authorizes each district planning group to request
3 7
additional resources that are needed to comply with the permanent limits. "
Second, if the Act proves totally unworkable in a district, the judicial emergency section allows the Judicial Conference to suspend the permanent limits
in that jurisdiction for one year. 338 Although Congress did not intend that the
provision be liberally applied, it permits at least temporary relief for a district
with unusually serious docket congestion. 339 Relaxation of the limits without
first exploring the use of these built-in "safety valves" would be an unwarranted and hasty step.
The Speedy Trial Act, like any other statute, does not please everyone. But
the repeated calls for its amendment ignore the fundamental urgency- the
public's interest in speedy criminal trials simply can no longer take second
place to crowded court calendars. Of course, restrictive application of the
excludable time provisions might indeed promote "speed for speed's sake";
such, however, was not the legislative design. Congress constructed the Act to
accommodate all reasonable interests in delay, especially those of defendants.
Indeed, despite three years of vigorous opposition, the drafters remain firm in
their conviction that the Act is a workable piece of legislation: "If some
courts find the law too rigid, it is because they have interpreted it more
stringently than was intended. '340 It is difficult to see how injection of even

the district court workloads. In fact, diversity jurisdiction accounted for 32.4% of the district
judges' civil time in 1976. Shapiro, supra note 335, at 335.
337. "Each plan shall further specify the . . . appropriations needed to effectuate further
improvements in the administration of justice in the district which cannot be accomplished
without such amendments or funds." 18 U.S.C. § 3166(d) (1976). These additional resources may
include new judgeships, magistrates, court reporters, clerks, probation officers, and supporting
personnel in the defender services and Department of Justice. 1978 Speedy Trial Report, supra
note 10, at 25-26. The three districts studied have requested additional resources in their final
plans. See D. Conn. Final Plan, supra note 88, at Vl-V2; D.N.J. Final Plan, supra note 96, at
50-51; E.D.N.Y. Final Plan, supra note 97, at V1-V6.
338. 18 U.S.C. § 3174 (1976); see note 84 supra and accompanying texL A recent Justice
Department report suggests that the dismissal sanctions be postponed: "The benefits of the act's
unique, graduated approach, will be substantially dissipated if the ultimate time limits and the
dismissal sanction come into effect simultaneously." Nat'l L.J., Mar. 12, 1979, at 5, col I
(quoting report). According to the report, if the final limits had been in effect in 1978 5,001 cases
would have been dismissed. That conclusion, however, was based on a study of only 460 cases,
and concedes that "common sense indicates that such a level of dismissals will probably not in
fact occur" when the permanent limits become effective. Id.
339. The process for application to relax the Act's limits is quite stringent, 18 U.S.C.
§ 3174(a) (1976). The district must prove to the satisfaction of the chief judge, planning group, and
judicial council that no other remedy for its court congestion is available. 18 U.S.C. § 3174 (a)lb)
(1976).

340.

65 A.B.A. J. 23 (1979) (paraphrasing statement of legislative aides).
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more relaxed measures into this inherently pliable statute would promote the
interests of justice.
Linda M. Ariola
Deborah A. DeMasi
Edward D. Loughman III
341
Timothy G. Reynolds
341. Parts I and II were prepared by Linda M. Ariola; Parts II and III by Timothy G.
Reynolds; Part IV by Edward D. Loughman III; and Part V by Deborah A. DeMasi.

APPENDIX
INFORMATION

GATHERED FROM JUDGES,

PROSECUTORS,

AND

DEFENSE ATTORNEYS

A.

Questions Asked of All Interviewees
1. What was his opinion concerning the effectiveness and/or desirability of standards for the prompt disposition of criminal cases prior to
the Speedy Trial Act?
2. Had he had experience under:
a) a state plan following the ABA Standards?
b) the Second Circuit Rules?
c) Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 50(b)?
3. Did he believe that problems which he may have encountered under
these prior rules were remedied or exacerbated by the Act?
4. Were there certain procedures which were useful in practice in the
past that can no longer be used under the shorter limits of the Act?
5. What techniques, if any, had he adopted to cope with the time
constraints of the Act?
6. Could he point to specific instances or illustrations which demonstrate the difficulties of compliance with the Act?
7. Did he believe that other factors, such as lack of manpower or case
complexity, account for failures to meet the Act's time limits, or are
the Act's limits unreasonable per se?
8. Did he advocate increased use of magistrates to help relieve court
congestion?
9. Would he prefer a single overall time limit?
10. Did he believe there should be separate time limits for certain
enumerated types of cases?
11. Did he feel the permanent time limits should be postponed to allow
more time for adjustment and compliance?
12. Did he advocate:
a) the continued existence of the Act without amendment?
b) the continued existence of the Act with a relaxation of the time
limits?
c) the repeal of the Act and a return to the ad hoc balancing test of
Barker v. Wingo?
d) a return to the district plans enacted under Federal Rule of
Criminal Procedure 50(b)?

B.

Questions Asked of Judges
1. What effect had the Act had upon his general calendar?
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2. Had the Act created greater backlogs or could he identify other
possible causes of present court congestion?
3. How many trial days can he now afford to spend on civil litigation?
4. Had there been a change in the number of days per month he
spends on trials?
5. Had the overall time he devoted to civil and criminal cases
changed?
6. Had the proportion of time he devoted to civil trials increased or
decreased?
7. To what extent did he use excludable time to give himself scheduling flexibility?
8. If he foresaw scheduling conflicts did he grant excludable time more
readily?
9. What arrangements did he make for scheduling cases when planning vacations for himself and his staff? What effect has the Act had
upon such planning?
10. Under what circumstances would he grant a section 3161(h)(8)
interests of justice exclusion?
11. Had his use of the interests of justice exclusion increased as the
permanent limits grew near?
12. Pursuant to section 3161(h)(1)(G), which allows for reasonable continuances, not to exceed thirty days, for motions held under advisement, did he routinely grant a full thirty day continuance in those
instances.
13. Did he believe that the Act reduces a judge's time for reflection?
14. Had he reassigned more cases as a result of the imposition of the
Act's time limits, and, if so, did he believe that this caused significant disruption of the single calendar system?
15. Had he increased settlements under the Act? In his opinion, what
effect did increased settlements have on civil litigation?
16. Did he often grant motions for hearings on the eve or day of trial,
and, if so, had this practice increased under the Act?
17. Did he rule on more motions from the bench as a result of the Act?
18. Did he hold evidentiary hearings on the eve or day of trial more
often than before the Act?

C.

Questions Asked of Prosecutors
1. Did he delay arrests more often in order to obtain more preparation
time before the limits were triggered?
2. How often was the first appearance of the defendant delayed under
the Act in order to gain more time?
3. Under what circumstances did judges deny or grant an interests of
justice exclusion?
4. In his experience, what were the most common grounds on which
excludable time had been granted?
5. In his experience, had judges usually granted excludable time from
the bench or taken the motion under advisement?
6. Had judges often granted excludable time continuances sua sponte?
7. Did he feel that judges held evidentiary hearings on the eve or day
of trial more often than before the Act?
8. Had he experienced insufficient time before trial to study complex
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materials?
9. Had he found that judges would grant excludable time if the cases
were unusually complex?
10. Did he prosecute fewer cases than before the Act in order to cope
with the short time limits or to concentrate on more serious offenses?
11. Had he been forced to reassign more cases as a result of the time
limits?
12. Did he foresee that more prosecutors will be needed to reduce the
pressures of the Act?
D.

Questions Asked of Defense Attorneys
1. Had the Government been cooperative in turning over discoverable
material?
2. Had he experienced insufficient time before trial to study complex
materials?
3. Did he believe that assistant U.S. Attorneys were unsympathetic to
the pressures upon defense attorneys created by the Act?
4. How often was the first appearance of the defendant delayed in
order to gain more time?
5. Had he experienced scheduling conflicts that forced him to reduce
his representation of defendants in federal court because federal
judges would not accommodate such schedule conflicts? Do the
short time limits make representation unattractive?
6. Had he been forced to reassign more cases as a result of the Act's
time limits?
7. Did he hesitate to make an appearance at arraignment for fear that
judges would not allow him to withdraw thereafter, even on the
ground that the client could not pay him for his services?
8. In his experience, had judges granted continuances when the defendant was not represented by counsel at time of arraignment?
9. In his experience, what were the most common grounds on which
excludable time had been granted?
10. In his experience, had judges usually granted excludable time from
the bench or taken the motion under advisement?
11. Had judges often granted excludable time periods sua sponte?
12. Had he found that judges would grant excludable time if the case
were unusually complex?
13. Under what circumstances had judges denied or granted an interests
of justice exclusion?
14. Did he believe that judges held evidentiary hearings on the eve or
day of trial more often than before the Act?
15. Did he advise clients to plead guilty on the eve of trial more often
since the enactment of the Act?
16. Did he enter more pro forma not guilty pleas to avoid violation of
the ten day indictment-to-arraignment limit?
17. Did he believe that the permanent limits provide insufficient time to
prepare a defense? Had he experienced insufficient time to prepare a
defense under the phase-in limits?
18. What were the major effects of the Act on defendants and his ability
to represent them?

